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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays which are organized as chapters. On the
first chapter, I compute welfare-maximizing monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules
using a calibrated DSGE model with sticky prices, monopolistic competition in the
intermediate goods market, and tax distortions. The exogenous government spend-
ing is considered to be productive. Therefore, the preferences of the representative
household and the technology of the production function include government spend-
ing which is decomposed into public consumption and investment. The optimal pol-
icy rules under which the nominal interest rate reacts to inflation, and the tax rates
responds to public debt are associated with the highest level of welfare which is sur-
prisingly equal to richer and baseline rules. The inflation volatility is closed to zero.
On the second chapter, I evaluate the impact of tax and monetary policy rules with dis-
aggregated government purchases on welfare, real exchange rate and business cycle in
a small open economy using a new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
frame work. The model predicts that the government consumption has more impact
than government investment on both private consumption and investment, but less im-
pact on the real GDP. Besides, the government purchases-real exchange rate puzzle is
generated by the model. In this sense, the government consumption contributes more
on generating the puzzle than the government investment. Moreover, both government
consumption and investment have positive impact on welfare for any policy rules. The
optimized policy rules have a pronounced anti-inflation stance and entail significant
nominal and real exchange rate volatility for monetary policy. For tax policy rules, the
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public debt stance is the optimized rules.
The last chapter tries to answer the following question: what are the effects of liquid-
ity facilities (unconventional credit policy) on macroeconomic and financial variables
when a small open economy faces a liquidity shock? To answer this question, we in-
troduction the external sector with foreign private paper and bonds in a DSGE model
with both nominal and real rigidities. The main result of this paper is that both uncon-
ventional credit policy has large quantitative effects on macroeconomic and financial
variables. In fact, with the quantitative easing, output, consumption and investment
stops to decrease after two quarters and then become positive. However, without the
liquidity facilities, output, consumption and investment would have dropped contin-
uously up to 10%, 15% 10%, respectively. This result is closely related to DEFK ’s
finding in terms of sign. Besides, the domestic inflation, the objective of the conven-
tional monetary policy, falls and becomes negative after four quarters. Then, it raises
and becomes positive up to two percent (2%) after eight quarters. Furthermore, a neg-
ative liquidity shock under the quantitative easing has positive impact on employment.
Nominal and real exchange rates depreciate due to a negative impact of liquidity shock.
Finally, the liquidity shock has positive impact on the financial variable (domestic and
foreign spreads). The domestic and foreign spreads increase up to 100 and 120 basis
points, respectively.
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Chapter 1
Maximizing Monetary and Tax Policy Rules
in a Closed Economy with Dissaggregate
Government Purchases
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Abstract
This paper computes welfare-maximizing monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules
using a calibrated DSGE model with sticky prices, monopolistic competition in the
intermediate goods market, and tax distortions. The exogenous government spend-
ing is considered to be productive. Therefore, the preferences of the representative
household and the technology of the production function include government spend-
ing which is decomposed into public consumption and investment. The optimal pol-
icy rules under which the nominal interest rate reacts to inflation, and the tax rates
responds to public debt are associated with the highest level of welfare which is sur-
prisingly equal to richer and baseline rules. The inflation volatility is closed to zero.
JEL Code : E52; E61; E63
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, Welfare, Productive Government Spend-
ing.
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1.1 Introduction
The aftermath of the international financial crises occurred in 2007 and 2008 have put in light the
role of fiscal policy to stabilize the output and boost the economy through the fiscal stimulus for
many developed and emerging economies, whereas, the monetary policy operated with zero lower
bound on nominal interest rate. The success of the fiscal stimulus is more questionable when we
consider the mitigate impact of the government spending on the major macroeconomic variables
such as output, private consumption and investment that predict theoretical and empirical standard
macroeconomic models. Most of time, the results depend either on financing decisions of govern-
ment spending or how the government spending is used in the model.
In one hand, the standard neoclassical models predict that the government spending shock has
a positive impact on output and hours of work, but has negative impact on private consumption
and investment. Baxter and King (1993), using a general equilibrium model, which allowed the
preferences and technology to depend both on private and government variables, found that the
government spending has positive impact on output and negative impact on private consumption
and capital stock because of the wealth effect that lower the disposable income. Besides, they
found that the financing decision is quantitatively much more important than the direct resource
cost of government spending. In fact, the impact is negative on output if higher government spend-
ing is financed by the general income tax. However, the lumps-sum tax is always associated with
a positive impact on output because of the wealth effect.
In other hand, the modification of neoclassical models through the New Keynesian Dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (NK-DSGE) model generates positive impact of government spend-
ing on private consumption and capital stock. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) build a model with
nominal rigidities (sticky prices) and found that the government spending shock has a positive
impact on private consumption due to the rise of real wages. Also, Linnemann (2006) modi-
fied the preferences of the representative household by not allowing consumption and leisure to
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be separated, found a positive response of consumption consecutive to a government spending
shock because of substitute effect between consumption and leisure. This explanation was ruled
out by Bilbiie (2006) who found that one of the goods (consumption or leisure) must be infe-
rior to predict that. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) build a NK-DSGE model with nominal
rigidities (prices) and real rigidities (rule-of-thumb behavior by some households) which generate
an increase in consumption in response to a rise in government spending. In fact, the rule-of-
thumb consumers partly insulate aggregate demand from the negative wealth effects generated
by the higher levels of taxes needed to finance the fiscal expansion, while making it more sen-
sitive to current disposable income. However, the sticky prices make it possible for real wages
to increase even in the face of a drop in the marginal product of labor, as the price markup may
adjust sufficiently downward to absorb the resulting gap. Furthermore, Escolani (2007) devel-
oped a NK-DSGE model which allows the preferences to depend both on private and government
consumptions and also considered two types of households (optimizing and non-optimizing), and
nominal rigidities (prices and wages) to analyze the relationship between private and government
consumptions. He found a complementarity relationship between them through the channel of the
marginal utility of consumption. Hence, the private consumption will rise after a positive shock on
government spending.
Moreover, Woodford (2010) summarized the mechanisms behind the above models associated
with the zero lower bound of nominal interest rate is used by the Central Bank. During the reces-
sion, the expansionary fiscal policy is very relevant and effective. When the Central Bank does not
act against the government, the expected inflation is higher than the current one which causes the
real interest rate to fall and multiplies a positive impact of government spending on output.
This paper evaluates the effects of monetary and fiscal policy rules on Welfare and Business
cycles for a closed economy using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
nominal rigidities (sticky prices), Tax distortion (consumption tax, labor income tax, and capi-
4
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tal income tax), and monopoly competition in intermediate goods markets in the New Keynesian
framework. I expend the model developed by Kollmann (2010 and 2008) and Baxter and King
(1993) with productive government spending. As Baxter and King (1993), I allow the prefer-
ences of the representative household to include not only the private consumption, but also the
consumption part of the government spending. Besides, the Cobb-Douglas production function of
the intermediate firms combine both private and public capital accumulation. The later production
function is the same as Baxter and King (1993) and Kollamann (2010). Also, the paper completes
the work of Schitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007, 2004).
This paper differs to Kollmann’s paper(2008) in two ways. The first difference is the decomposi-
tion of the government spending into consumption and investment based on the roles they played
in economic activities, whereas Kollmann’s paper consider the government spending as ’useless’
in the sense that it doesn’t not affect directly the preference of the representative household and
the technology of the intermediate goods’ producers. The second difference is related to the gov-
ernment funding. In this paper, I consider the variety of income tax and consumption tax while
Kollmann considered the income tax only. This paper will also evaluate the dynamic of the gov-
ernment purchases on key macroeconomic variables and household welfare. Besides, the effect of
government spending on macro variables is evaluated here using welfare-maximization operational
feedback rules in addition to others macroeconomic variables such as the private capital accumu-
lation and output that others papers have not taken into account so far. The welfare evaluation is
based on the works of Kollmann (2002 and 2008) that is more realistic than the Ramsey approach.
In fact, the simple feedback rules link monetary and fiscal policy to small sets of easily observ-
able macro variables (Kollmann 2002). The model features the exogenous shocks to productivity,
public consumption and investment. The tax rates which describe the fiscal policy are set as a
function of real public debt, productivity, public consumption , public investment, and inflation.
However, the monetary policy follows a Taylor-style nominal interest rate rule which is set as a
function of inflation, output, and government deficit. In order to compare the results with Koll-
5
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mann (2008), I calibrate my model using the quarterly data (1990:1 to 2012:4) of OECD countries .
The results show that the introduction of the government spending in the both preferences and
production function changes the channel by which the government spending shocks affect the
main macroeconomic variables such as the output, the private consumption and the capital accu-
mulation. In fact, the government spending shock (globally) has positive effect on output, private
consumption, and private capital accumulation. Both richer and simpler rules show that the gov-
ernment consumption is complement to the private consumption. Furthermore, the public capital
accumulation is complement to the private capital accumulation which contradicts Baxter and King
(1993) work. Hence, those results point out the role of each component of the government spend-
ing on economic activities.
Under the price stickiness, monopolistic competition, income tax, and the government spending
in both preferences and production function, the optimized monetary policy is full inflation stabi-
lization (Kollamann 2002, 2008; Erceb et al. 2000; Rotemberg and Woodford). This paper finds
the same results. Besides, the optimized fiscal policy implies that an increase in the stock of the
debt by an amount equal to (quartly) steady state GDP raises the capital, labor income, and con-
sumption tax rates by 2.2257, 1.0003, and 0.0314 percentage points which is relative lower than
what Kollmann (2008) found in his paper without government spending in the preferences and
production function (9.09) for the proportional tax rate.
The rest paper will be organized as follow. I will present the model in details in section 2 in-
cluding the welfare evaluation and the solution method. The results are presented in section 3 and
will conclude the paper in section 4.
6
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1.2 The Model
I consider a model with the representative household, the firms, government and the central bank.
I assume that the representative household owns all the means of productions. Therefore, the
household rents the capital stock to firms and supplies the labor force in competitive markets
for labor and capital stock. The economy produces two types of goods. The single final good is
produced by combining the continuum of intermediate goods indexed by s∈ [0,1]. The assumption
of the perfect competitive market holds only for the final good. The intermediate goods producers
operate in a monopolistic competitive market. Finally, the government finances its spending by
levitating income tax (on labor, rental capital) and consumption tax. Also, the government issues
nominal bonds with maturity in period t +1.
1.2.1 The Representative Household
The representative household maximizes his preferences through
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β
tU(Ct ,GCt ,Lt), (1.1)
where Et represents the mathematical expectation condition upon the complete information per-
taining to period t and earlier. Also, 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor. Finally, Ct ,Lt ,
and GCt represent respectively the consumption, labor effort, and government consumption at time
period t. The utility function is given by
U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt) = ln(Ct + γGCt)−ψLt (1.2)
7
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Since the household holds all factors of production, the law of motion of capital stock is given by
PKt+1 = PKt +(1−δ )+ IPt (1.3)
where PKt+1, PKt , IPt , and δ represent respectively the private capital stock at period t + 1, the
private capital stock at time t, the gross private investment at time t, and the depreciation rate of
the capital (0 < δ < 1).
Besides, At+1 represents the riskless one-period bonds paying one unit of the numéraire in the
following period t +1 while At is the quantity of bonds carried over from period t−1. Therefore,
the household budget constraint at period t is
At+1 +Pt(Ct + It) = Rt−1At +Rkt−1PKt−1 +
ˆ 1
0
π(s)ds +WtLt−Tt (1.4)
where Rt−1 is the gross interest rate on bonds. Also, Rkt , Wt , Tt , and Gt represent, respectively, the
rental rate of capital, the rental rate of labor, the total taxes received by the government from the
household, and the government spending. Finally, τCt , τ
K
t , and τ
L
t are the consumption tax rate, the
capital tax rate, and the labor income tax rate.
Tt = τCt Ct + τ
K
t R
k
t Kt−1 + τ
L
t WtLt−δτkt PtKt−1 (1.5)
Therefore, the household maximizes (2) subject to (3), (4) and (5) from which the first order
conditions are derived:
Etρt,t+1
(
(1+ τCt )
(1+ τCt+1)
)
Rt
(
Pt
Pt+1
)
= 1 (1.6)
8
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Etρt,t+1
(
(1+ τCt )
(1+ τCt+1)
)[
(1+ τKt+1)R
K
t +δτ
K
t+1 +(1−δ )
]
= 1 (1.7)
(
1
(Ct + γGCt
)(
(1− τLt )
(1+ τCt )
)
Wt = ψ (1.8)
where ρt,t+1 = β
(
(Ct+γGCt)
(Ct+1+γGCt+1)
)
is the stochastic discount factor.
1.2.2 The Final Good Firms
The economy produce the final good according the aggregate technology
Zt =
[ˆ 1
0
y
ϑ
(ϑ−1)
t (s)ds
] (ϑ−1)
ϑ
(1.9)
with ϑ > 1.
Where Zt is the final good output at period t. Besides, yt(s) is the quantity of type s intermediate
goods used to produce the final good. Assume thatpt(s) is the prices of intermediate goods. Then,
the cost minimization in final good production implies
yt(s) = (pt(s)/Pt)−νZt (1.10)
with Pt =
(´ 1
0 p
1−ν
t (s)ds)
) 1
1−ν and where Pt is the price of final good. Also, Pt represents the
marginal cost since the final good is used by perfectly competitive firm.
9
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1.2.3 The Intermediate Goods Firms
The domestic intermediate good s is produced using the technology
yt(s) = θtKαt (s)L
1−α
t (s), (1.11)
where θt , and Kt are respectively exogenous productivity and aggregate capital stock that are
identical for all domestic producers; yt is the output at period t.
Kt = GKt +PKt , (1.12)
where GKt represents the public capital stock that is exogenous and identical for all domestic pro-
ducers.
As for the private capital stock, the law of motion of the public capital stock is given as
GKt = (1−δ )GKt−1 + Igt , (1.13)
where Igt is the public investment.
The cost minimization of (11) subject to the total cost
(
WtLt(s)+Rkt Kt(s)
)
from which the first
order conditions are derived and implied
Lt(s)
Kt(s)
=
(
(1−α
α
)(
Rkt
Wt
)
(1.14)
,and the marginal cost is given by
MCt =
(
1
θtGKωt
)[
(Rkt )
αW 1−αt α
−α(1−α)α−1
]
(1.15)
10
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The profits of domestic intermediate good producer, πt is
πt (pt(s)) = (pt(s)−MCt)
(
pt(s)
Pt
)−ν
Zt (1.16)
The price is set according to Calvo (1983). The intermediate firms are not allowed to adjust
their prices optimally in each period. There is a constant probability 1− d where d ∈ (0,1) that
the firm can adjust its price randomly. Otherwise the price remained unchanged. The expected
time between price adjustments is 11−d . The firms are assumed to meet all demand at posted prices.
They maximize the value of their profit stream, net of the income tax paid by the household on
profits. Therefore, at date t, the firm sets a new price, pt,t . The firm sets
pt,t = ArgMaxp
∞
∑
j=0
d jEt [ρt,t+ j(1− τπt+ j)πt+ j(p)|Pt+ j] (1.17)
ρt,t+ j is the stochastic discount factor price that equals the household’s marginal rate of substitution
between consumption at t and t + j. The solution of the maximization problem regarding pt,t is
pt,t =
ν
ν−1
[
∑
∞
j=0 d
jEtΞt,t+ j(1− τπt+ j)MCt+ j
∑
∞
j=0 d jEtΞt,t+ j(1− τπt+ j)
]
(1.18)
where Ξt,t+ j = ρt,t+ j(Pt+ j)ν−1Zt+ j
Then, the price level of the final good in period t is
P1−νt = dP
1−ν
t +(1−d)p1−νt,t (1.19)
11
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1.2.4 The Government
The government alleviates tax on all sources of income for households. Also, the government
issues one period debt, Dt , that matures at t, and balances its budget at each period. I consider the
government final good purchases, Gt , as exogenous.
PtGt +Dt−1Rt−1 = Dt +Tt (1.20)
I define the real government debt normalized by steady state real GDP as Bt ≡
(
Dt
PtYss
)
.
The Government spending is decomposed into
Gt = GCt + Igt (1.21)
where GCt and Igt are the government consumption and investment in period t.
Therefore, the tax policy rules are set as
τ
C
t = τ
C
ss +φ
B
C B̂t +φ
GC
C ĜCt +φ
Ig
C Îgt +φ
θ
C θ̂t +φ
Π
C Π̂t (1.22)
τ
K
t = τ
K
ss +φ
B
K B̂t +φ
GC
K ĜCt +φ
Ig
K Îgt +φ
θ
K θ̂t +φ
Π
K Π̂t (1.23)
τ
L
t = τ
L
ss +φ
B
L B̂t +φ
GC
L ĜCt +φ
Ig
L Îgt +φ
θ
L θ̂t +φ
Π
L Π̂t (1.24)
where B̂ =
(
Bt−Bss
Bss
)
, ĜC =
(
GCt−GCss
GCss
)
, Îg =
(
Igt−Igss
Igss
)
, θ̂ =
(
θt−θss
θss
)
, Π̂ =
(
Πt−Πss
Πss
)
, and Πt =(
Pt
Pt+1
)
.
12
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It is important to indicate that the variables with subscripts ”ss” denote the steady state values.
Besides, I distinguish, as Kollmann(2008) three types of feedback policy rules :
• the "simpler rules" which stipulate that the any tax rate above reacts only to the real govern-
ment debt;
• the "reacher rules" which link any tax rate to real government debt, government consump-
tion, government investment, productivity shock, and inflation; and
• the "baseline rules" which link any tax rate to real government debt, government consump-
tion, government investment, and productivity shock.
I assume that the government commits to setting the policy parameters φ BC , φ
GC
C , φ
Ig
C , φ
θ
C ,
and φ ΠC at values that maximize the unconditional expected value of household utility sub-
ject to the restriction that the unconditional mean of real debt has to close to its steady state
value (Kollmann 2008) as
|EBt−Bss|< 0.01. (1.25)
The equation (24) is set to rule out the long-run values of debt and taxes that differ greatly
from the values observed in reality which has been showed by Aiyagari et al.(2002) from the
optimal Ramsey fiscal policy.
1.2.5 The Central Bank
Following Taylor (1993, 1999), the central bank set the short-run nominal interest rate, Rt , in
response to inflation and output gaps.
Rt = Rss +φ ΠR Π̂t +φ
y
RŶt +φ
De f
R
ˆDe f t (1.26)
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where Ŷt =
(
Yt−Yss
Yss
)
, and ˆDe f t =
(
De ft−De fss
De fss
)
.
De ft represents the government primary deficit which is defined as
De ft = Bt−Bt−1
Therefore, two policy rules will be discussed in this paper as in Kollmann (2008):
• the "simpler rules" is defined as the nominal short-run interest rate reacts only to inflation
gap and
• the "reacher rules" link the nominal short-run to inflation gap, output gap and government
deficit.
.
As the government, the central bank also commits to setting the policy parameters φ ΠR ,φ
Y
R , and
φ
De f
R at the values that maximize the unconditional expected value of household utility.
1.2.6 Market Clearing Conditions
The intermediate goods markets clear as firms meet all demand at posted prices. The markets for
final good, labor, and capital rental clear when:
Zt =Ct + It +Gt ,Lt =
ˆ 1
0
Lt(s)ds,Kt =
ˆ 1
0
Kt(s)ds,andπt =
ˆ 1
0
πt(s)ds (1.27)
The bond market is cleared when
At−Bt = 0. (1.28)
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1.2.7 Exogenous Variables
I consider three shocks in this model: the productivity and the different types of government spend-
ing.
θ̂t = ρ
θ
θ̂t−1 + eθt , (1.29)
where 0≤ ρθ < 1, and eθt N(0,σ2eθ ).
ˆGCt = ρGCĜCt−1 + eGCt (1.30)
where 0≤ ρGC < 1 and eGCN(0,σ2eθ )
ˆIgt = ρ IgÎgt−1 + e
Ig
t (1.31)
where 0≤ ρ Ig < 1 and eIgt N(0,σ2eθ )
1.3 Calibration and Solution Method
In order to compare the results with Kollamann (2008), I solve my model using Sims’ (2000)
second-order accurate method. The welfare is evaluated through a second-order Taylor expansion
of the utility function around the steady state which gives E(U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)) ∼= U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)+
E(Ĉt + γĜCt))−LE(L̂t)−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt)), where Var(Ĉt + γĜCt) is the variance of Ĉt + ĜCt).
By expressing the welfare as the permanent relative change in private consumption and government
consumption (compared to the stady state), ξ , which gives
E(U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)) :U((1+ξ )(Ct ,GCt),Lt)∼=U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)+E(Ĉt +γĜCt)−LE(L̂t)−Var(Ĉt +γĜCt)
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. Hence, the welfare ξ can be decomposed into two components ξ m and ξ v as following:
U((1+ξ m)(Ct ,GCt),Lt) =U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)+E(Ĉt + γĜDt)−LE(L̂t)
,
U((1+ξ v)(Ct ,GCt),Lt) =U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt)
. ξ m and ξ v represent the mean of private consumption plus non-investment government spending,
and hours worked, and variance of private consumption plus non-investment government spending.
By applying the equation (2) into the previous equations yields
ln(1+ξ ) = E(Ĉt + γĜCt)−LE(L̂t)−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt), (1.32)
ln(1+ξ m) = E(Ĉt + γĜCt)−LE(L̂t), (1.33)
ln(1+ξ v) =Var(Ĉt + γĜCt). (1.34)
Therefore,
(1+ξ ) = (1+ξ m)(1+ξ v). (1.35)
The model is calibrated to quarterly data (1990:1 to 2012:4) of OECD countries. The parameters
are set as shown in the table 1. The parameters are consistent with previous studies on OECD coun-
tries (Kollmann (2008), Baxter and King (1993), Schitt-Grohe(2004, 2007), Gali et al. (2007)).
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Table 1.1: Parameters’ values
Parameter Value
β .99
α .24
γ .38
δ .025
ν 6
d .75
r 1.01
ρθ .95
ρGC .95
ρIg .95
ω .39
σθ 0.01
σGC 0.01
σ Ig 0.01
1.4 Results
The simulations results are reported in table 2, table 3 and figures 1 to 3. The table 1 reports the
results for the optimized policy rules. However, the table 3 reports the optimized parameters rules.
The figures 1 to 3 present the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to the shocks. The
columns 1 to 4 in table 1 show the results under sticky prices. Besides, all variables are expressed
in terms of deviation from the steady state.
The results show that the introduction of the government spending in the both preferences and
production function changes the channel by which the government spending shocks affect the
main macroeconomic variables such as the output, the private consumption and the capital accu-
mulation. In fact, the government spending shock (globally) has positive effect on output, private
consumption, and private capital accumulation. Both richer and simpler rules show that the govern-
ment consumption is complement to the private consumption and positive correlated with private
capital accumulation, hours worked and output. However, the public capital accumulation is also
complement to the private capital accumulation which contradicts Baxter and King (1993) work
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using the distortion tax. Hence, those results point out the role of each component of the govern-
ment spending on economic activities.
Under the price stickiness, monopolistic competition, income tax, consumption tax and the gov-
ernment spending in both preferences and production function, the optimized monetary policy is
full inflation stabilization (Kollamann 2002, 2008; Erceb et al. 2000; Rotemberg and Woodford).
In fact, the optimized policy rule implies that an increase in the inflation gap by one percent in-
creases the nominal interest rate by 1.04 percent. Besides, the optimized fiscal policy implies that
an increase in the stock of the debt by an amount equal to (quarterly) steady state GDP raises the
consumption, capital income , and labor income tax rates by .03, 2.23, and 1.003 percentage points
which is relative lower than what Kollmann (2008) found in his paper without government spend-
ing in the preferences and production function (9.09).
The real debt fluctuations are highly persistent (autocorrelation 0.99) and volatile (standard de-
viation of real debt 1.37%). The inflation and the gross return on capital fluctuations are also
highly persistent (autocorrelation .97 and .97 respectively) and less volatile (standard deviation
0.08% and 0.1%). Other variables’ fluctuations are highly persistent (autocorrelation .95 in aver-
age) and highly volatile (standard deviation 5.83% in average). In fact, the most volatile variable
is private investment (standard deviation 35.49%). Besides, the consumption tax rate which un-
dergoes anticyclical fluctuations (correlation with the GDP is -.39) is the second highest volatile
variable (standard deviation 18.58%.
The unconditional mean value of the output exceeds its steady state value by 0.31%. The mean of
the consumption also exceeds its steady value by .32%. Besides, the conditional mean of the infla-
tion and real debt are slightly below their steady state by 0.02%. This confirms that the optimized
monetary policy entails full inflation stabilization. Moreover, the mean value of the capital stock
exceeds slightly its steady state by 0.07% which may be viewed as reflecting precautionary saving
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(also confirmed by Kollamann 2008). Furthermore, the conditional welfare is higher than steady
state welfare measure, ξ = 1.308076%, based on all the shocks. The mean of the welfare con-
tributes positively, ξ m = 0.39.976%. Its variance contributes mostly with ξ = 0.917100% (This
level of welfare is higher than Kollmann 2008). When, we consider the shock individually, govern-
ment consumption and investment have bigger effect on welfare than the productivity. This can be
explainable by the fact that the government spending is included in the preferences and production
function.
Under the flexible prices, the welfare (ξ = 1.706702%) is greater than under sticky price (ξ =
1.308076%) which is consistent with current literature (Obdtfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998, 2000,
and 2001), Betts and Devereux 1996, Devereux and Engel 2003 and 2006, Kollmann 2002, and En-
gel 2013). In fact, the literature predicts high welfare under flexible prices than under sticky prices.
The productivity shock is the major source of volatility of macroeconomic variables.In fact, the
productivity shock explains the variances of the output, consumption, capital stock, hours worked,
inflation and nominal interest rate by 55.58%, 75.91%, 81.14%, 61.27%, 85.96% and 85.54% re-
spectively when I take into account all shocks. This finding is consistent with Kollmann (2008).
Under the optimized policy, the paper finds that a positive productivity shock raises the output,
the consumption, the capital stock, the investment, and the hours worked. However, the inflation
and the income tax rate are negative affected by the productivity shock. Besides, a positive govern-
ment consumption shock increases the output, the consumption, the capital accumulation and the
tax rates. Moreover, a positive public capital stock shock increases all key macro variables (con-
sumption, output, capital stock, investment), but lowers the gross return on capital. Finally, the
richer policy rules are slightly associated with the same welfare gain as the simpler rules (positive
gain) which is the same as the work of Kollmann (2008). Therefore, the single-minded pursuit of
price stability by many central banks in OCDE countries seems effective if we consider the welfare
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policy evaluation criterion. This is also confirmed by the finding of Kollmann (2008).
1.5 Conclusion
This paper computers welfare-maximizing monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules in calibrated
DSGE model with sticky prices, monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods markets, and
tax distortions. The government spending shock is decomposed into public investment and con-
sumption. Also, the model allows the government consumption in the preferences of the represen-
tative household and the public capital stock in the production function of the intermediate goods’
producer. The simpler optimized policy rules are not only full inflation stabilization for monetary
policy, but also public debt stance for the fiscal policy.
The future works in this paper will expand the model to an open economy and will compare
the policy rules under sticky prices with flexible prices, tax distortion and lap sum tax. Also, the
model will include more frictions such as the adjustment costs, the consumption habit, and the
non-optimized consumers.
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Table 1.2: Optimized policy rule
variable Sticky Prices Flexible Prices
Baseline rules Baseline rules Richer Rules Simpler Rules Baseline Rules
θ , GC, Ig GC, Ig θ , GC, Ig θ , GC, Ig θ , GC, Ig
Standard deviations(in %)
K 5.42 5.9 5.99 5.35 0.33
IP 34.43 0.69 15.03 35.49 2.67
GK 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.10
C 3.86 4.69 4.69 3.8 0.23
Π 0.29 0.02 0.1 0.08 0.50
G 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.39
GC 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Ig 0.32 0.32 0.09 0.32 0.22
B 8.1 6.28 2.28 1.37 0.77
Def 1.72 0.97 .97 1.8 0.62
R 5.42 0.9 3.97 5.41 0.34
Correlations with GDP
R -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.91
G 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.10 0.28
GC 0.002 0.15 0.0012 0.11 0.25
Ig 0.04 0.016 0.02 0.0156 0.13
τk -0.32 -0.38 -0.36 -0.39 -0.73
τc -0.71 -0.72 -0.95 -0.39 -0.68
τ l -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.39 -0.77
Autocorrelations
Y 0.76 0.80 0.93 0.92 0.82
R 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.82
τk 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.85
τc 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.81
τ l 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.90
B 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.83
Means (in %)
Y -0.02 -0.02 -1.28 -0.02 1.13
C -0.23 -0.23 -1.81 -1.23 0.26
L -0.19 -0.19 -1.55 -1.19 0.71
K -0.31 -0.31 -0.42 -0.31 2.43
τk -1.31 -1.31 -1.19 -1.31 -8.30
τc -0.59 -0.59 -18.89 -0.59 -1.04
τ l -0.60 -0.60 -6.81 -0.60 -2.99
B 0.56 0.56 -9.4 0.56 -4.15
Welfare (in %)
ξ 0.000172 0.000172 1.099802 1.308076 1.706702
ξ m 0.000002 -0.000004 0.182702 0.390976 0.789603
ξ v 0.000170 0.000176 0.917100 0.917100 0.917099
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Table 1.3: Policy Parameters
variable Sticky Prices
Baseline rules Baselinerules Richer Rules Simpler Rules
θ , GC, Ig GC, Ig θ , GC, Ig θ , GC, Ig
φ ΠR 1.025 1.025 1.025 1.03
φYR 0.7215 0.7215 0.7215 —
φ
De f
R — — -0.6745 —
φ BK 2.2189 2.2189 2.2189 2.2257
φ GCK -0.6367 -0.6367 -0.6367 —
φ
Ig
K -0.6023 -0.6023 -0.6023 —
φ θK -0.6396 -0.6396 -0.6396 —
φ ΠK -0.4859 -0.4859 -0.4859 —
φ BC 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669 0.0314
φ GCC -0.6432 -0.6432 -0.6432 —
φ
Ig
C -0.5225 -0.5225 -0.5225 —
φ θC -0.6786 -0.6786 -0.6786 —
φ ΠC -0.4116 -0.4116 -0.4116 —
φ BL 1.0113 1.0113 1.0113 1.003
φ GCL -0.3524 -0.3524 -0.3524 —
φ
Ig
L -0.5799 -0.5799 -0.5799 —
φ θL -0.6123 -0.6123 -0.6123 —
φ ΠL -0.6072 -0.6072 -0.6072 —
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A. Impulse Response Functions 
A.1. Impact of 1% increase on Government Consumption 
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A.2. Impact of 1% increase on Government Consumption 
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A.3. Impact of 1% increase on Government Investment 
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A.4. Impact of 1% increase on Government Investment 
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A.5. Impact of 1% increase on Productivity 
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A.6. Impact of 1% increase on Productivity 
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B. The Model’s Non-Linear Equilibrium Conditions
Yt =Ct + It +Gt (36)
Gt = GCt + Igt (37)
GKt = Igt +(1−δ )GKt−1 (38)
PKt = It +(1−δ )PKt−1 (39)
Kt = PKt +GKt (40)
βEt
[
Ct + γGCt
Ct+1 + γGCt+1
(
1+ τCt
)(
1+ τCt+1
) ( Rt
Πt+1
)]
= 1 (41)
βEt
[
Ct + γGCt
Ct+1 + γGCt+1
(
1+ τCt
)(
1+ τCt+1
) ((1− τKt+1)RKt +δτKt+1 +(1−δ ))
]
= 1 (42)
1
Ct + γGCt
(
1− τLt
)(
1+ τCt
)Wt = ψ (43)
Yt = θ tGKωt K
α
t L
1−α
t (44)
Wt = (1−α)MCt
Yt
Lt
(45)
RKt = αMCt
Yt
Kt
(46)
Nt = YtMCt +ηβEt
[
Ct + γGCt
Ct+1 + γGCt+1
Π
ν
t+1Nt+1
]
(47)
Jt =
ν
ν−1
Nt (48)
P∗t =
(
1−ηΠν−1t+1
1−η
) 1
1−ν
(49)
Jt = YtP∗t +ηβEt
[
Ct + γGCt
Ct+1 + γGCt+1
(
P∗t
P∗t+1
)
Π
ν−1
t+1 Jt+1
]
(50)
Gt +Rt−1Bt−1 = Bt +Tt (51)
Tt = τCt Ct + τ
K
t (R
K
t −δ )Kt + τLt WtLt (52)
log(GCt) = ρgclog(GCt−1)+ egct (53)
log(Igt) = ρIglog(Igt−1)+ eIgt (54)
log(θt) = ρθ log(θt−1)+ eθ t (55)
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(
Rt
Rss
)
=
(
Πt
Πss
)φ ΠR ( Yt
Yss
)φYR ( De ft
De fss
)φ De fR
(56)(
τCt
τCss
)
=
(
Πt
Πss
)φ ΠC ( Bt
Bss
)φ BC ( GCt
GCss
)φ GCC ( Igt
Igss
)φ IgC ( θt
θss
)φ θC
(57)(
τLt
τLss
)
=
(
Πt
Πss
)φ ΠL ( Bt
Bss
)φ BL ( GCt
GCss
)φ GCL ( Igt
Igss
)φ IgL ( θt
θss
)φ θL
(58)(
τKt
τKss
)
=
(
Πt
Πss
)φ ΠL ( Bt
Bss
)φ BK ( GCt
GCss
)φ GCK ( Igt
Igss
)φ IgK ( θt
θss
)φ θK
(59)
C. Steady State
I assume that the steady state values of inflation are Πss = 1. Besides, I fix the steady state values
of the exogeneous variables are set as θss = 1, GCss = 0.1, and Igss = 0.1. It is very easy to fix the
worked hours as Lss = 13 and Bss = 0 in order to solve numerecally with dynare for the steady state
values of remained variables.
MCss =
ν−1
ν
(60)
Πss = 1 (61)
θss = 1 (62)
Yss =Css + Iss +Gss (63)
Gss = GCss + Igss (64)
I pss = δPKss (65)
GKss =
Igss
δ
(66)
Rss =
Πss
β
(67)
β
[
(1− τKss)+ατKss +(1−δ )
]
= 1 (68)[
1
Css + γGCss
(1− τLss)
(1+ τCss)
Wss
]
= ψ (69)
Nss =
YssMCss
1−ηβ
(70)
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Jss =
ν
ν−1
Nss (71)
P∗ss = 1 (72)
Jss =
Yss
1−ηβ
(73)
Tss = τCssCss + τ
K
ss(R
K
ss−δ )Kss + τLssWssLss (74)
Gss = Tss (75)
Yss = θssKαssL
1−α
ss (76)
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Chapter 2
Tax and Monetary Policy Rules in a Small
Open Economy with Dissaggregate
Government Purchases
Abstract
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of tax and monetary policy rules with dissaggregate govern-
ment purchases on welfare, real exchange rate and business cycle in a small open economy using
a new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium frame work. The model predicts that the
government consumption has more impact than investment on both private consumption and in-
vestment, but less impact on the real GDP. Moreover, the government purchases-real exchange rate
puzzle is generated by the model. In this sense, the government consumption contributes more on
generating the puzzle than the investment. Moreover, the productive and complement government
purchases have positive impact on welfare for any policy rules. The optimized policy rules have
a pronounced anti-inflation stance and entail significant nominal and real exchange rate volatility
for monetary policy. For tax policy rules, the public debt stance is the optimized rules.
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2.1 Introduction
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of tax and monetary policy rules with decomposed govern-
ment purchases (consumption and investment) on welfare, real exchange rate and business cycle
for an small open economy using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
nominal rigidities: monopoly competition and sticky prices à la Calvo for intermediate producers.
The model also takes into account seven chocks due to : (i) the domestic productivity, (ii) the world
interest rate, (iii) the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) (Fama 1984), (iv) the world output,
(v) the government consumption, (vi) government investment, and (vii) the world inflation. In
fact, this paper adds the government sector to the model developed by Kollmann 2002. Many pa-
pers have analyzed the impact of government purchases on private consumption, output, and real
exchange rate (Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe, 2007, Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Kollmann,
2010; Basu and Kollman, 2013). The latter paper finds that a rise in government purchases not
only increases the private consumption, but also depreciates the real exchange rate due to the intro-
duction of productive government investment if these purchases increase domestic private sector,
and labor supply is highly elastic. These main results raise two important puzzles: (i) the govern-
ment purchases-consumption puzzle (Sanchez, 2001; Linnemann and Schabert, 2003; Blanchard
and Perotti 2002; Linnemann, 2008; Gali et Al. 2007; Escolani, 2007; Mountford and Uhlig,
2009; Woodford, 2010) and (ii) government purchases-real exchange rate puzzles (Sanchez, 2001;
Forni and Pisani, 2010; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Kollmann, 2010; Basu and Kollmann, 2013).
This paper aims to analyze the effect of decomposed the government purchases (consumption and
investment)on a small open economy. Which government purchases contribute more to the depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate, the household’s welfare and the business cycle? This question
will help to understand the mechanism by which the decomposed government purchases affect an
small open economy with respect to optimized tax and monetary policy rules.
The puzzles are due to the fact that the main results mentioned above contradict the predictions
of the standard neoclassic models which find that the rise in government purchases (i) decreases
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private consumption (Baxter and King, 1993; Backus et Al. 1994; Ramey and Shapiro 1998;
Ramey, 2008), and (ii) appreciates the real exchange due to the wealth effect (Kollmann, 1991,
1995; Backus et al. 1993, 1994) which lowers private consumption and increases hours of work
and output. Therefore, if the consumption risk is internationally shared through complete financial
markets, the rise in the home marginal utility of consumption is accompanied by an appreciation
of the home real exchange rate. However, the model developed in this paper generates the govern-
ment purchases-real exchange rate puzzle through marginal product of both labor and capital.
The introduction of the government purchases in both utility and production functions follows
the seminal work of Baxter and King (1993) in which the private and government consumption
in the utility function of the representative agent is separated. However, this paper will consider a
non-separate formulation between the private and government consumption which should sustain
their complementary. Besides, most of macroeconomic models have neglected to analyze the ef-
fect of the decomposed government purchases in the entire economy and the literature related to
the question is not abundant. This paper aims to enrich the literature by analyzing the effect of
the decomposed government purchases in a small opened economy through the optimized tax and
monetary policy rules.
As the model deals with many relative prices, the paper takes into account the departure from
the law of one price (LOP) which implies limited exchange rate pass-through and price to market
(PTM) behavior of producers (Knetter, 1993; Betts and Devereux, 2000;Kollmann, 2002; Dev-
ereux and Engel,1998, 2002; Devereux and Yetman, 2014). In fact, the price to market assumption
means that the producers will charge price in the currencies of their costumers. Therefore, the
monetary authority set a rule which links the nominal interest rate to gross domestic PPI inflation.
This rule will be compared to alternative measures of inflation such as the producer currency pric-
ing, gross consumer price index (CPI) inflation,and exchange rate peg.
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Furthermore, the financial market for bonds is assumed to be incomplete because the world house-
holds do not buy bonds issued in small open economy currency. Only the households in small
open economy who hold both bonds in domestic and foreign currencies. Therefore, the consump-
tion risk is not efficiently shared internationally (e.g., Kollmann 2010). Any rise in the government
purchases will depreciate the real exchange rate.
I assume here that the government consumption is complement to the private consumption (e.g.,
Bouakez and Rebei, 2007; Gali et al., 2007; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010). This channel works
perfectly through the international risk sharing of the consumption growth between the domestic
and the foreign economies to explain the depreciation of real exchange. Besides, government con-
sumption contributes to increase the aggregate demand which has positive impact on final goods.
However, the government investment is productive in the sense that it increases the productivity of
both labor and the effective capital stock through public capital stock. Therefore, the government
investment increases output and depreciates the real exchange rate (the second channel). So far
in the literature, the role of the government consumption to generate the depreciation of real ex-
change rate has never been studied. This paper investigates the impact of decomposed government
purchases not only on real exchange rate, but also on welfare-optimized tax and monetary policy
rules and business cycle.
The paper finds that the government consumption has more impact than investment on both pri-
vate consumption and investment, but less impact on the real GDP. Moreover, the government
purchases-real exchange rate puzzle is generated by the model. In this sense, the government
consumption contributes more on the generate the puzzle than the investment. Besides, both gov-
ernment consumption and investment have positive impact on welfare for any policy rules. The
optimized policy rules have not only a pronounced anti-inflation stance and entail significant nomi-
nal and real exchange rate volatility for monetary policy, but also a public debt stance for tax policy
rules.
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The mechanism by which the decomposed government purchases-exchange rate puzzle is gen-
erated by the model is different for each component of the government purchases. An increase in
the government investment shock improves both marginal productivity of labor and capital stock
which have a positive impact on labor supply, private capital stock, and output. This supply effect
boosts the private consumption and wealth which depreciate the real exchange rate (first channel).
The second and the third channels through which the government consumption deteriorates the real
exchange rate is the international risk sharing. If the real exchange rate is expressed in terms rela-
tive marginal utility of domestic and foreign consumption, an increase in government consumption
will depreciate the real exchange rate through two channels. The first channel is a direct effect of
the government consumption on real exchange rate. The second channel is the complement rela-
tionship between private consumption and government consumption.
The rest paper will be organized as follow. I will present the model in details in section 2. The
results are presented in section 3 and will conclude the paper in section 4.
2.2 The Model
The model describes here is a New-Keynesian DSGE model for a small open economy with a rep-
resentative household, firms, a government, a central bank, and rest of the world. The model adds
the government agent to the model developed by Kollmann (2002).
The representative household maximizes his utility under the budget constraint and the law of
motion of the private capital. Also, he holds all means of production (labor and private capital
stock) that are rent/supply to firms in a perfect competitive market. From the revenues that he
receives, he consumes, invests in capital stock, and saves in terms of bonds (domestic and foreign).
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There are two types of firms : the firms which produce the final goods and the ones which pro-
duce the intermediate goods. I assume that the final composite good is not tradable in the world
market. Only the intermediate goods are tradable between the small open economy and the rest of
the world. The composite final good is produced by combining the intermediate goods from the
domestic and import foreign firms. There is a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by sε[0,1].
The government sector collects taxes, issues the debt through the central bank and finances its
consumption and investment purchases. The latter is used to produce the domestic intermediate
goods and the former to be consumed by the representative household. This is one the contribution
of this paper.
The central bank issues bonds for domestic government and set the nominal interest according
to the Taylor rules.
Finally, the rest of the world imports the intermediate goods which are used to produce the
composite final domestic goods. Also, it sells the foreign bonds to the representative household.
2.2.1 The representative household
The representative household maximizes his preferences through
E0
t=∞
∑
t=0
β
tU(Ct ,GCt ,Lt). (2.1)
where E0 represents the mathematical expectation conditional upon the complete information per-
taining to period t and earlier. Also, 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor. U(.) is the utility
function which is monotone and continuous. Finally, Ct , Lt , and GCt represent respectively the
private consumption, labor effort, and government consumption at time period t. Let the utility
function take the following form:
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U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt) = ln(Ct + γGCt)−ψLt . (2.2)
I assume here that the government consumption is complement to the private one. This assumption
is important to generate the government purchases-real exchange rate puzzle.
Since the household holds all domestic producers and accumulates physical capital. The law of
motion of the capital stock is given by
PKt = (1−δ )PKt−1 + I pt (2.3)
where PKt , PKt−1, I pt , and 0 < δ < 1 represent respectively the private capital stock at period t ,
the private capital stock at time t− 1, the gross investment at time t, and the depreciation rate of
the capital stock.
Besides, the household’s budget constraint at period t is defined as
Adt+1 +StAt+1 +Pt(Ct + I pt) = Rt−1A
d
t +Stϕt−1R ft−1At +R
K
t−1PKt−1 +DIVt +WtLt−Tt (2.4)
where
Tt = τCt PtCt + τ
K
t R
K
t PKt−1 + τ
L
t WtLt− τKt PtPKt−1 (2.5)
where Adt and At are the net stocks of risk-free domestic and foreign currency bonds that mature
in period t. Rt−1 is the interest rate on domestic currency bonds and R ft−1 is the interest rates on
foreign currency bonds adjusted by a risk premium, ϕt−1. This risk premium is a endogenous func-
tion which is a decreasing function of stationary holding of foreign assets of the entire domestic
43
Page 43 of 166
economy, and a increasing function of risk premium shock, χt−1. The endogenous risk premium
function has the following form
ϕt−1 = exp(−
(
At−1
Ass
)
+χt−1) (2.6)
where
lnχt−1 = ρχ lnχt−2 + ε
χ
t−1. (2.7)
χt−1 can be interpreted as bias in the household’s date t−1 forecast of the date t exchange rate, St ,
based on yesterday information about interest rate (Kollmann, 2002). Besides, the stock of bonds
from domestic government is assumed to be non-negative. In fact, the household is not allowed
to borrow from the government. The foreign bonds are bought from the world market. Here, the
model allows this stock of bonds to be negative or positive. If the stock is negative, it means that
the household is a net borrower and a net lender, otherwise.
Moreover, RKt , Wt , Tt , DIVt , and St represent, respectively, the rental rate of capital, the rental
rate of labor, the total taxes received by the government from the household, the dividend received
by household and the nominal exchange rate. Finally, τCt , τ
K
t , and τ
L
t are the tax rates on consump-
tion (generally known as the value added tax in most of European countries), capital, the and labor
income respectively.
Therefore, the household maximizes (1) subject to (4) and (5) from which the first order condi-
tions are derived which respect to domestic currency bonds, international currency bonds, private
capital stock at time t, and labor hours:
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1 = βEt
[(
Ct + γGCt
Ct+1 + γGCt+1
)(
1+ τCt
1+ τCt+1
)
1
πt+1
Rt
]
, (2.8)
1 = βEt
[(
Ct + γGCt
Ct+1 + γGCt+1
)(
1+ τCt
1+ τCt+1
)
1
πt+1
et+1ϕtR ft
]
, (2.9)
1 = βEt
[(
Ct + γGCt
Ct+1 + γGCt+1
)(
1+ τCt
1+ τCt+1
)(
RKt (1− τKt+1)+δτKt+1 +(1−δ )
)]
, (2.10)
ψ =
[(
1
Ct + γGCt
)(
1− τLt
1+ τCt
)
Wt
1
φt
]
, (2.11)
et+1 is the depreciation factor of the nominal exchange rate between period t + 1 and t which is
defined as:
et+1 =
St+1
St
. (2.12)
2.2.2 Uncovered Interest Parity
Combining equations (6) and (7) yields
Rt = Etet+1ϕtR ft . (2.13)
Then, the log-linearization around the steady state of (13) gives the uncovered interest parity (UIP)
condition with an endogenous risk premium, ϕt :
Et Ŝt+1− Ŝt = R̂t− R̂ f t− ϕ̂t . (2.14)
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I define Ŝt = St−SssSss , R̂t =
Rt−Rss
Rss
, R̂ f t =
R ft−R fss
R fss
, and ϕ̂t =
ϕt−ϕss
ϕss
where the subscript ss means
steady state value. I assume here that ϕt is one at steady state in order to solve the model. the
the The departure of the UIP condition was first empirically observed by Fama (1984) is measured
here by ϕt . This endogeneous risk premium function is introduced following Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2003) in order to make the small open economy model stationary.
2.2.3 The firms
• Final good
The economy produce the final good according the aggregate technology
Zt =
[
(1−αm)
1
ϑ (Y dt )
(ϑ−1)
ϑ +(αm)
1
ϑ (Y mt )
(ϑ−1)
ϑ
] ϑ
(ϑ−1
(2.15)
where Zt is the final good output at time t; Y dt is the quantity of domestic intermediate goods
used to produced the final good output; Y mt is the quantity of imported intermediate goods used
to produce the final good output;ϑ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the imported and
domestic intermediate goods in the production of the final good output; and αm is the share of
imported intermediate good in the production of the composite final good. Also, it determines the
steady state degree of openness (here is expressed in terms of imports to GDP ratio) of the country
to the rest of the world.
Besides, I assume the firm operates in a perfectly competitive market. It takes the price of out-
put, Pt , as given. Therefore, if Pdt and P
m
t are prices of domestic and imported intermediate goods
sold in the domestic market, the problem of the firm consists of cost minimizing of the production
of the final composite output by combining the inputs (intermediate goods) subject to (15) above
which yields the following demands for intermediate goods required to produce the final composite
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good:
Y mt = α
m
(
Pmt
Pt
)−ϑ
Zt , (2.16)
and
Y dt = (1−αm)
(
Pdt
Pt
)−ϑ
Zt , (2.17)
where
Pt =
[
(1−αm)(Pdt )1−ϑ +αm(Pmt )1−ϑ
] 1
(1−ϑ)
. (2.18)
Since the firm operates in a perfectly competitive market, the price, Pt , is also its marginal cost.
Finally, Pt is the consumer price index (CPI).
• The Domestic Intermediate goods
The domestic intermediate good s is produced using the technology
Yt(s) = θtKt−1(s)αLt(s)1−α (2.19)
where Yt is the final good output at period t, and θt is the exogenous domestic productivity
shock which is identical to all s firms.
Kt(s) = GKt +PKt(s), (2.20)
Kt is the effective (total) capital stock and GKt is the exogenous government capital stock available
at time t and is identical to all firms.
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Assume in the first stage that the wage rate is Wt and the rental capital rate is RKt . Then, the
problem for the firms consists of choosing Lt and Kt , taking Wt and RKt as given, which maximize
their profit function:
Π
d
t+ j(s) = P
?d
t (s)Yt+ j(s)−RKt+ jKt+ j(s)−WtLt+ j (2.21)
subject to (19) whose first order conditions are:
Wt = (1−α)
MCtYt(s)
Lt(s)
(2.22)
where MCt is the marginal cost and P?dt is the price of the intermediate goods in domestic currency,
RKt = α
MCtYt(s)
Kt(s)
. (2.23)
The total domestic production is used domestically, Y dt or exported to the world market, Y
x
t , so
that
Yt = Y dt +Y
x
t , (2.24)
where Y xt is the total export for the small open country whose demand function in the world market
is
Y xt = α
x
(
Pxt
P?t
)−η
Z?t . (2.25)
Pxt represents the price of the export intermediate good in the world market, Pt? the exogenous
world price level, αx the share of the small open economy’s export in the world market, and Z?t the
world output level. Z?t is exogenous in the small open economy.
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Since the intermediate goods’ firms operate in a monopolistic competition market, they gain prof-
its. Then, in the second stage the firms set the price à la Calvo (1983) that maximizes the expected
discounted real profits. Therefore, in each period, a fraction of (1−λ ) firms are able to reset their
prices, while others keep unchanged their prices. Usually, the period from which the price is un-
changed is 1(1−λ ) .
Thus, the firms solve the following problem
max
P?dt (s)
Et
∑
∞
j=0(βλ )
j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Πdt+ j(s)
Pdt+ j
subject to (19).
The following demand function is derived as the solution of the above problem:
Y dt+ j(s) =
(
P?dt (s)
Pdt+ j
)−ν
Y dt+ j (2.26)
whose first order condition with respect to P?dt is
P?dt =
ν
ν−1
Et ∑∞j=0(βλ )
j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Yt+ j(s)MCt+ j
Et ∑∞j=0(βλ ) j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Yt+ j(s)/Pdt+ j
. (2.27)
The import price index is
(Pdt )
1−ν = λ (Pdt−1)
1−ν +(1−λ )(P?dt )1−ν . (2.28)
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Analogously, the firms can choose a new export price at time t by solving the following problem
max
P?xt (s)
Et
∑
∞
j=0(βλ )
j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Πxt+ j(s)
Pxt+ j
above subject to (19) and the demand function
Y xt+ j(s) =
(
P?xt (s)
Pxt+ j
)−ν
Y xt+ j. (2.29)
The solution gives P?xt as
P?xt =
ν
ν−1
Et ∑∞j=0(βλ )
j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Yt+ j(s)MCxt+ j
Et ∑∞j=0(βλ ) j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Yt+ j(s)/Pxt+ j
. (2.30)
where
MCxt =
Pdt
Pxt St
, (2.31)
and St is the nominal exchange rate expressed here as the domestic currency price of foreign
currency.
The import price index is
(Pxt )
1−ν = λ (Pxt−1)
1−ν +(1−λ )(P?xt )1−ν . (2.32)
• The Imported Intermediate goods
As for the domestic intermediate goods, the imported intermediate producers set their price à la
Calvo (1983).
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The importer s sets its price, P?mt (s), that maximizes the expected discounted profits below,
taking as given the nominal exchange rate, St , and the world price level, P?t ,
max
P?mt (s)
Et
∑
∞
j=0(βλ )
j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Πmt+ j(s)
Pmt+ j
subject to
Y mt+ j(s) =
(
P?mt (s)
Pmt+ j
)−ν
Y mt+ j. (2.33)
where
Π
m
t = (P
?m
t (s)−MCmt )
(
P?mt (s)
Pmt
)−ν
Y mt , (2.34)
where the marginal cost for importer is
MCmt =
StP?t
Pmt
. (2.35)
The solution for P?mt implies the following first order condition
P?mt =
ν
ν−1
Et ∑∞j=0(βλ )
j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Y mt+ j(s)MC
m
t+ j
Et ∑∞j=0(βλ ) j
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+ j+γGCt+ j
)
Y mt+ j(s)/P
m
t+ j
. (2.36)
The import price index is
(Pmt )
1−ν = λ (Pmt−1)
1−ν +(1−λ )(P?mt )1−ν . (2.37)
2.2.4 The Government
The government alleviates tax on all sources of income for households. Also, the government
issues one period debt, Dt , that matures at t, and balances its budget at each period. I consider the
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government final good purchases, Gt , as exogenous.
PtGt +Dt−1Rt−1 = Dt +Tt (2.38)
where Tt = τCt PtCt + τ
K
t R
K
t PKt−1 + τ
L
t WtLt− τKt PtPKt−1.
I define the real government debt normalized by steady state real GDP as Bt ≡
(
Dt
PtZss
)
.
The Government spending is decomposed into
Gt = GCt + Igt (2.39)
where GCt and Igt are the government consumption and investment at period t. I assume here
that, the public capital evolves according to
GKt+1 = Igt +(1−δ )GKt . (2.40)
Therefore, the tax policy rules are set as
τCt
τss
=
(
Bt
Bss
)γBC ( GCt
GCss
)γGCC ( IGt
IGss
)γ IgC ( θt
θss
)γθC ( πt
πss
)γθC
, (2.41)
τKt
τss
=
(
Bt
Bss
)γBK ( GCt
GCss
)γGCK ( IGt
IGss
)γ IgK ( θt
θss
)γθK ( πt
πss
)γθK
, (2.42)
τLt
τss
=
(
Bt
Bss
)γBL ( GCt
GCss
)γGCL ( IGt
IGss
)γ IgL ( θt
θss
)γθL ( πt
πss
)γθL
. (2.43)
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It is important to indicate that the variables with subscripts ”ss” denote the steady state values.
Besides, I distinguish, as Kollmann(2008) three types of feedback policy rules :
• the "simpler rules" which stipulate that the any tax rate above reacts only to the real govern-
ment debt;
• the "reacher rules" which link any tax rate to real government debt, government consump-
tion, government investment, productivity shock, and inflation; and
• the "baseline rules" which link any tax rate to real government debt, government consump-
tion, government investment, and productivity shock.
I assume that the government commits to setting the policy parameters φ BC , φ
GC
C , φ
Ig
C , φ
θ
C , and
φ ΠC at values that maximize the unconditional expected value of household utility subject to the
restriction that the unconditional mean of real debt has to close to its steady state value (Kollmann
2008) as
|EBt−Bss|< 0.01. (2.44)
The equation (44) is set to rule out the long-run values of debt and taxes that differ greatly from
the values observed in reality which has been showed by Aiyagari et al.(2002) from the optimal
Ramsey fiscal policy.
2.2.5 The Central Bank
Following Taylor (1993, 1999), the central bank set the short-run nominal interest rate, Rt , in
response to inflation and output gaps.
Rt
Rss
=
(
πdt
πdss
)φπ ( Zt
Zss
)φZ ( et
ess
)φe
(2.45)
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Therefore, two policy rules will be discussed in this paper:
• the "simpler rules" is defined as the nominal short-run interest rate reacts to inflation and
output gap (e.g., Taylor, 1993, 1999; Kollmann, 2002, 2008)
and
• the "reacher rules" link the nominal short-run to inflation, output and deprecation factor of
the nominal exchange rate gap.
.
As the government, the central bank also commits to setting the policy parameters φπ ,φZ , and φe at
the values that maximize the unconditional expected value of household utility.
2.2.6 Relative Prices and International Risk Sharing
Since the model is solved in real terms, I have defined some relative prices in order to simplify
many things.
ψ
lop
t = MC
m
t =
StP?t
Pmt
= et
π?t
πmt
ψ
lop
t−1 (2.46)
describes the deviation from the law of one price (LOP) because I impose that ψ lopt is different
from one. However, in steady state psilopss must be equal to one.
ψ
?
t =
P?t
Pt
=
π?t
πt
ψ
?
t−1 (2.47)
ψ
x
t =
Pxt
P?t
=
πxt
π?t
ψ
x
t−1 (2.48)
ψ
d
t =
Pdt
Pt
=
πdt
πt
ψ
d
t−1 (2.49)
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ψ
m
t =
Pmt
Pt
=
πmt
πt
ψ
m
t−1. (2.50)
Let now define the real exchange rate and the international risk sharing respectively as
RERt =
StP?t
Pt
= Stψ?t . (2.51)
RERt =
(
C?t +γGC
?
t
C?t+1+γGC
?
t+1
)
(
Ct+γGCt
Ct+1+γGCt+1
) (2.52)
2.2.7 Market clearing conditions
The intermediate goods markets clear as firms meet all demand at posted prices. The market for
final good, labor, and capital rental clear when:
Zt =Ct + I pt +Gt , (2.53)
Lt =
ˆ 1
0
Lt(s)ds, (2.54)
and
Kt =
ˆ 1
0
Kt(s)ds. (2.55)
The bond market clearing requires as Kollmann (2002), I assume that foreigners do not hold bonds
denominated in the currency of small open economy. Therefore, the bonds markets clear:
Adt = 0, (2.56)
and
55
Page 55 of 166
ψ
?
t ψ
x
t Y
x
t −ψ?t Y mt = At−ϕtR ft−1At−1 (2.57)
The equation (56) determines the evolution of the net foreign assets following Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2003). It represents the balance of payments that includes the risk premium on foreign
assets holding by households. The left hand side of equation (56) represents the balance of trade,
while the right hand side represents the balance of capital. Finally, I define the net asset position
as NFAt = AtP?t Zss
2.2.8 Exogenous variables
I consider nine shocks in this model: the domestic productivity, the world inflation, the world
interest rate, the world output, the UIP, the government consumption, the government investment,
the preference, and the labor supply which are expressed as following :
logZ?t = ρZ?logZ
?
t−1 + εZ? (2.58)
logπ?t = ρπ?logπ
?
t−1 + επ? (2.59)
logIgt = ρIglogIgt−1 + εIg (2.60)
logGCt = ρGClogGCt−1 + εGC (2.61)
logχt = ρχ logχt−1 + εχ (2.62)
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logR ft = ρR f logR ft−1 + εR f (2.63)
logθt = ρθ logθt−1 + εθ (2.64)
2.2.9 Solution method and Welfare measures
I solve my model using Sims’ (2000) second-order accurate method. The welfare is evaluated
through a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function around the steady state which
gives
E(U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt))∼=U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)+E(Ĉt + γĜCt))−LssE(L̂t)−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt)) (2.65)
where Var(Ĉt + γĜCt) is the variance of (Ĉt + ĜCt).
By expressing the welfare as the permanent relative change in private consumption and govern-
ment consumption (compared to the stady state), ξ , which gives
E(U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)) : U((1+ξ )(Ct ,GCt),Lt)∼=U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)+E(Ĉt + γĜCt)−LssE(L̂t)−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt).(2.66)
Hence, the welfare ξ can be decomposed into two components ξ m and ξ v as following:
U((1+ξ m)(Ct ,GCt),Lt) =U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)+E(Ĉt + γĜDt)−LssE(L̂t) (2.67)
U((1+ξ v)(Ct ,GCt),Lt) =U(Ct ,GCt ,Lt)−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt). (2.68)
ξ m and ξ v represent the mean of private consumption plus non-investment government spending,
and hours worked, and variance of private consumption plus non-investment government spending.
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By applying the equation (2) into the previous equations yields
ln(1+ξ ) = E(Ĉt + γĜCt)−LssE(L̂t)−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt) (2.69)
ln(1+ξ m) = E(Ĉt + γĜCt)−LssE(L̂t) (2.70)
ln(1+ξ v) =−Var(Ĉt + γĜCt) =Var(Ĉt)+ γ2var(ĜCt)+2cov(Ĉt , ĜCt) (2.71)
Therefore,
(1+ξ ) = (1+ξ m)(1+ξ v). (2.72)
2.2.10 Parameters (non-policy)
Most of non-policy parameters is calibrated to quarterly data for France, Germany, the U.K and
Netherlands from 1977 to 2007. The period is chosen because of the availability of quarterly data.
Other parameters follow the works of Bouakez and Rebei (2007, Kollmann (2001),and Baxter
and King (1993), and . The real domestic and foreign interest rate are set to be equal at steady
state which are derived from the first order conditions with respect to domestic and foreign bonds,
Rss = R fss = πssβ . The inflation (CPI) is set to 1.005 which means that is 2% annually. Therefore,
β = πssRss .
The indexation of prices, ν is set to 6 which corresponds to Kollmann (2001)’s the price-
marginal cost steady state markup factor for intermediate goods ν(ν−1) = 1.2. The price elasticities
of substitution between import and domestic intermediate goods, in one hand, and between the ex-
port and foreign intermediate goods are set ϑ = η = 0.6, in other hands. Moreover, the elasticity
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of output with respect to capital, α , is set to 0.24 which is consistent also with Kollmann (2002)
and Bouakez and Rebei (2007). The depreciation rate of the capital stock, δ , is set to 0.025 which
corresponds to many previous studies (e.g., Bouakez and Rebei, 2007; Kollmann, 2002, 2008, and
2010.....). Following Kollmann (2002), λ = 0.75, the average interval that producers of intermedi-
ate goods change their prices à la Calvo.
Furthermore, the risk premium parameter, αA, the steady state import/Zss ratio, αm, the steady
state export/Z?ss ratio, and the degree of complementarity (substitution) between private and gov-
ernment consumptions, γ , are set to 0.8, 0.3, 0.0075, and 0.39 respectively. The last parameter is
consistent with Baxter and King (1993).
Finally, the parameters’ values related to all shocks (rho.. and variances ε ...) are included in the
appendix C.
2.3 Results
The main results of the simulation are reported in table 1 according to the baseline model (sticky
prices with optimized policy) and all other alternative models (flexible prices, producer currency
pricing, and fixed exchange rate regime). The tables 2 and 3 report the variation decomposition of
main variables and the predicted standard deviations and mean values of important variables. The
impulse response functions are shown in the appendix A.
As for Kollmann (2002), the statistics/responses for the domestic interest rate, NFAt , and different
tax rates refer to differences of these variable from steady state values. However, the statistics of
the remaining variables are referred to relative deviations from steady state values.
59
Page 59 of 166
2.3.1 Results for the baseline model (sticky prices)
The results are reported on the table 1 column (1). The optimized policy rules’ coefficients are the
following:
• Monetary Policy rule: Rt = Rss +3.857π̂dt −0.024Ẑt−0.001531êt
• Income tax rate rule: τCt = τCss +1.5B̂t−0.25ĜCt−0.02 ˆIGt−0.1θ̂t +0.1π̂t−0.2êt
• Capital tax rate rule: τKt = τKss +1.25B̂t−0.64ĜCt−0.5 ˆIGt−0.1θ̂t +0.1π̂t−0.2êt
• Income tax rate rule: τLt = τLss +1.75B̂t−0.5ĜCt−0.4 ˆIGt−0.45θ̂t +0.2π̂t−0.1êt .
The simple rules which link the nominal gross interest rate on bonds to both output and inflation
gap for monetary policy and each tax rate to public debt give the welfare level closed to above
rules. This optimized policy rule has a strong stance on inflation. The central bank rises the nom-
inal interest rate in response to an increase in domestic PPI inflation. Following Kollmann 2002,
there is a contrast result for the coefficient of output gap which is -0.024 (Kollmann calibrated
-0.01). However, this coefficient is closed to zero.
The negative sign of output gap is due to UIP shock which increases the mean of foreign asset
holdings, imports of goods and services, private consumption, and welfare. At the same time, it
decreases the domestic output for the first 20 quarters, exports for the first 15 quarters, and the
domestic nominal interest rate for the first 5 quarters. Besides, the UIP shock appreciates both
nominal and real exchange rate. As the optimal policy rule is based on the household’s welfare
criterion which is dominated by the mean of private consumption, the UIP condition (equation
2.16) forces the central bank to decrease the nominal interest after any increase in output gap.
The welfare level for the richer rule (as given on the table 2.1) is ζ = 0.760664% against for
the simple rule of ζ = 0.734483%. Besides, when I consider the monetary policy rule without
the factor of depreciation rate of exchange rate (êt), the welfare drop from ζ = 0.760664% to
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ζ = 0.757956% which corresponds to a gap of 0.002708%. Therefore, when the central bank
adjust the nominal rate to the factor of depreciation rate of exchange rate, the welfare gain is
0.002708%. This result is consistent with Kollmann (2002) who finds a gain of 0.002%. The level
of the welfare is decomposed into mean (ζ m = 0.084656%) and variance (ζ v = 0.760664%).
The standard deviation for the domestic PPI inflation is 0.7818% for the richer rule with ê against
0.6375% for the simple rule. However, the standard deviation for the CPI is lower than the do-
mestic PPI 0.6345%. Furthermore, the standard deviation for output, consumption, and private
investment are 1.7317%, 1.5245%, and 11.8239% respectively. The predicted standard deviation
for the private investment is very higher than other variables. Standard deviation for private con-
sumption and output is relatively closed to Kollmann (2002) which were about 2%. The standard
deviation of net foreign asset and the real exchange rate are 3.35504% and 2.0903% respectively.
The mean of the hours worked, output, inflation (CPI), inflation (PPI), private capital stock and
total capital stock are respectively 0.738%, 0.9124%, 0.0102%, 0.0123%, 2.0722% and 1.4645%
below their steady state. However, the mean of the private consumption is about 0.1531% above
its steady state. Furthermore, the mean of the stock of foreign asset is above its steady state by an
amount which is about 0.2957% of the steady state of the real GDP. Moreover, the mean of the real
exchange rate shows an appreciation of 0.0966% with respect to its steady state and the mean of
nominal exchange exhibits a depreciation of 0.1073% with respect to its steady state. Finally, the
mean of import of intermediate goods is about 8.7088% below its steady state.
The government purchases are positive correlated with private consumption, real output, private
capital stock, and hours worked. However, there negatively correlated with both real and nominal
exchange rate. More specifically, the coefficient of correlation between the government purchases
and the macroeconomic variable listed above are respectively 0.0078, 0.046, 0.0121, 0.0477, -
0.1404 and -0.2038 for private consumption, real output, private capital stock, hours worked, nom-
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inal and real exchange rate.
When I consider the decomposed government purchases, the government consumption is highly
correlated to major macroeconomic variables relative to government investment. In fact, the co-
efficient of correlation between government consumption and other macroeconomic variables are
respectively 0.0073, 0.0466, 0.0112, 0.0479, -0.1406 and -0.2056. However, the coefficient of
correlation between government investment and other macroeconomic variables are respectively
0.0035, 0.0010, 0.0063, 0.0029, -0.0108 and -0.0079.
The variance decomposition of the major macroeconomic variables indicates that the productivity
shock is the main source of volatility of these variables. In fact, the productivity shock explains
78.78% of the variance of real output, 77.69% of private consumption, 85.23% of hours worked,
80.23% of private investment, 83.30% of the CPI inflation, 86.96% of producer domestic inflation,
50.31% of real exchange rate, and 65.10% of nominal exchange rate. Besides, the world inflation
shock constitutes the second main source of volatility after the productivity shock.
The dynamic responses to the different shocks show that the real GDP and private consumption
raises in response to one percent increase in world output shock, world inflation shock, and domes-
tic productivity shock. However, the world interest rate, and the risk premium lower the real GDP
after two first quarters. The private consumption lowers in risk premium shock and world interest
rate. The real exchange rate depreciates in response to an increase in world output, risk premium
shock, and world interest rate. However, the real exchange rate appreciates after an increase in
world inflation shock(after the first two quarters) and productivity shock. Furthermore, the nomi-
nal exchange rate appreciates due to an increase in world output shock(after the first two quarters),
and world inflation (after 7 quarters). Nevertheless, the nominal exchange rate depreciates after a
positive shock to the risk premium shock, world interest rate, and domestic productivity. Finally, a
positive world interest rate shock (for the first 10 quarters), domestic productivity shock (after the
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first 7 quarters), risk premium shock (for the last thirteen quarters), and world inflation increase
the nominal gross domestic interest rate. However, the nominal gross domestic interest rate falls
after a positive world output (after the first ten quarters), world interest rate for the first fifteen
quarters, and the domestic productivity shock (the first eight quarters). These results are confirmed
by Kollmann, 2002.
2.3.2 Results for Flexible price
Under the richer rule, the welfare level is ζ = 2.404015% whose gain is driven mostly by its mean
component, ζ m = 2.182918%. Besides, the contribution of the variance component is not negligi-
ble , ζ v = 0.221098%. This result seems confirm the literature (Obdtfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998,
2000, and 2001), Betts and Devereux 1996, Devereux and Engel 2003 and 2006, Kollmann 2002,
and Engel 2013). In fact, the literature predicts high welfare under flexible price than under sticky
price.
The standard deviation for the domestic PPI inflation is 0.2196% which is slightly lower than
the CPI inflation which is 0.3850%. Moreover, the standard deviation for output, consumption,
and private investment are 0.2247%, 0.3790%, and 7.9329% respectively. The predicted standard
deviation for the private investment is very higher than other variables which means that the private
investment is more volatile than other variables. Finally, the standard deviation of net foreign asset
and the real exchange rate are 0.7389% and 0.7161% respectively. In comparison to the sticky
price model, this model is less volatile which confirm the literature(Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan,
2000).
The mean of hours worked and output are respectively 0.5494% and 0.1334% below their steady
state. However, the mean of the private consumption, private investment, inflation (CPI), inflation
(PPI), private capital stock and total capital stock are respectively 1.0825%, 1.6750%, 0.0494%,
0.1502%, 1.6750%, and 1.1838% above their steady states. Moreover, the mean of the stock of for-
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eign asset is above its steady state by an amount which is about 0.5523% of the steady state of the
real GDP. Furthermore, the mean of the real exchange rate shows a depreciation of 3.8717% with
respect to its steady state and the mean of nominal exchange exhibits a depreciation of 2.8836%
with respect to its steady state. Finally, the mean of import of intermediate goods is about 3.7675%
above its steady state.
2.3.3 Results for Producer Currency Pricing
The previous models assume that the intermediate goods are sold in consumers’ currencies which
implies the deviation from the law of one price and full exchange rate pas-through. In the sub-
section, I assume that the LOP holds. Therefore, under the optimized rule, the welfare is ζ =
2.458651% whose gain is driven mostly by its mean component, ζ m = 2.232015629%. Besides,
the contribution of the variance component is not negligible , ζ v = 0.226635783%. As I mentioned
in the previous subsection, the literature has predicted that the producer currency pricing generates
the welfare level higher than the consumer currency pricing, especially under the flexible exchange
rate regime which is under analysis (e.g, Devereux and Engel 1998, Engel 2013).
The standard deviation for the domestic PPI inflation,0.1615%, is slightly lower than the CPI
inflation which is 0.2039%. Moreover, the standard deviation for output, consumption, and private
investment are 0.2229%, 0.3765%, and 7.6400% respectively. The predicted standard deviation
for the private investment is very higher than other variables which means that the private invest-
ment is more volatile than other variables. Finally, the standard deviation of net foreign asset and
the real exchange rate are 0.5436% and 0.7261% respectively.
In comparison to the price to market pricing, the standard deviation of the domestic PPI infla-
tion is lower than the domestic CPI inflation with lowest for PCP (.1615%) against 0.2196% for
flexible price. Therefore, the welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules entails the sta-
bilization of the domestic PPI inflation which also confirms by previous works (e.g., Devereux and
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Engels, 1998; Betts and Devereux, 2000; Kollmann, 2002; Senay and Sutherland, 2010).
2.3.4 Results for fixed Exchange Rate
Under the richer rules, the welfare level is ζ = 0.034306% which is mostly dominated by its
variance component, ζ v = 0.033085%. The contribution of the mean component is negligible,
ζ m = 0.001221%. Therefore, by pegging the exchange rate, the welfare is reduced significantly in
comparison to the flexible exchange rate regime (ζ = 0.760664%). These results are confirmed by
the previous studies (Engel 2013; Devereux and Yetman 2012; Kollamnn 2002).
Besides, the volatility of the main macroeconomic variable such as nominal and real exchange
rate, private consumption, output, net foreign assets, and private investment is high under this
regime than the flexible one. In fact, the standard deviation of nominal and real exchange rate,
private consumption, output, net foreign assets, and private investment are respectively 6.52%,
4.26%, 1.81%, 3.03%, 8.23%, and 25.02%.
Moreover, the means of private consumption, hours worked, private capital stock, import of in-
termediate goods, and export of intermediate output are below their steady state, respectively, by
2.76%, 2.64%, 1.54%, 0.11%, and 12.48%. However, the means of output and domestic interme-
diate goods are above their steady state values by 1.57% and 0.63% respectively. Furthermore, the
mean of the real exchange rate shows a depreciation of 1.65% with respect to its steady state value.
The net foreign assets is above its steady state by an amount which is about 0.46% of the steady
state of the real GDP.
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2.3.5 Impact of Decomposed Government purchases on Real Exchange Rate
and other macroeconomic variables
Following Kollmann 2002 and 2010, and Basu and Kollmann 2013, the model generates the gov-
ernment purchases-exchange rate puzzles for all the models. Specifically, the impact of gov-
ernment purchases on both the real exchange rate is reported in the different impulse response
functions. Based on the sticky price model (baseline model), a positive government consump-
tion contributes more to the depreciation of both nominal and real exchange rates than a positive
government investment. In fact, the nominal exchange rate depreciates by 5% immediately, then
attains a peak of 13% after ten quarters, and falls at 4% by the end of the twenty fifth quarter due
to a positive government consumption shock. Nevertheless, the depreciation of nominal exchange
rate after a positive government investment is not only about 0.4% immediately, but also does not
exceed 1.5% for the entire period of simulation. Moreover, the depreciation of real exchange rate
attains 9% due to a positive government consumption, while a positive government investment
depreciate the real exchange rate by no more than 1% for the all quarters.
For the flexible prices’ model, the results seems little different from the sticky price one. A positive
government consumption shock induces a depreciation of both real and nominal exchange rates by
11% in high. In contrary, the results are ambiguous for a positive government investment shock.
The depreciation is confirmed fully for the real exchange rate by 0.2% in high. But it does not gen-
erated the depreciation of nominal exchange after seven quarters. In fact, any positive government
investment will appreciate the latter in long run (after the first seven quarters).
The transmission mechanism through which the government purchases generate the depreciation
of both nominal and real exchange rates does not differ much of the previous works by Kollmann
(1995, 2010) and Basu and Kollmann (2013). In fact, in the literature, so far, there are two main
links : the international risk sharing and marginal productivity of public capital stock. This paper
adds two additional links through which the decomposed government purchases depreciate the real
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exchange rate: marginal utility of private consumption and marginal productivity of private capital
stock.
An increase in the exogenous government consumption has positive impact on private consump-
tion. This result is a puzzle because it contradicts the prediction of both classical and Keynesian.
It well known as the crowdind-out of private consumption assumption. By this mechanism, the
decrease in private consumption increase the relative consumption on the definition of the interna-
tional risk sharing which appreciate the real exchange rate. However, when there is crowdind-in of
the private consumption, the relative consumption will decrease, then the real exchange rate will
depreciate. Another way to see it is through the marginal utility of consumption.
Moreover, the previous work on the topic by Kollmann (1995, 2010) and Kollmann and Basu
(2013) predict the link between the real exchange rate and government purchases through the
marginal productivity of labor which increases the output. This paper finds another channel, the
marginal productivity of the private capital stock since the latter works did not include the private
capital. By this channel, the government investment has a double impact on output: it boosts not
only the marginal productivity of total capital through the productivity public capital, but also the
marginal productivity of labor which both have a strong impact on output.
The last prediction of the previous works is the completeness of the market of asset market. Since
in the paper I consider the case of incomplete asset market in the sense that the domestic bonds are
not allowed to be purchased by the foreign households. Therefore, the latter limits the international
risk sharing which plays an important role on generating the depreciation of the real exchange rate
after a raise on government consumption through the crowding-in of private consumption (see
Kollmann, 2010).
Finally, a raise on both government consumption and invest has a positive impact of output with a
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delay of two quarters, private consumption and investment in long run, hours worked, gross return
on bonds, the next foreign asset position, the export of domestic intermediate goods, domestic in-
termediate goods, and imports. However, it creates inflation (both CPI and PPI). This is the main
channel through which the government spending-real exchange rate puzzle is generated. In fact,
the crowd-in on both private consumption and investment implies high output and price level due
to a rightly shift of the aggregate demand on the market of goods and services. Thus, on the money
market, the increase in both real output and price level will imply high interest rate and quantity of
money. From UIP condition (equation 2.14), an increase in domestic nominal interest will result
to the depreciation of nominal and real exchange rate.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper aims to evaluation the impact tax and monetary policy rules with decomposed govern-
ment purchases on welfare, real exchange rate and business cycle in a small open economy using
a new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium frame work. The model predicts that the
government consumption has more impact than investment on both private consumption and in-
vestment, but less impact on the real GDP. Moreover, the government purchases-real exchange rate
puzzle is generated by the model. In this sense, the government consumption contributes more on
generating the puzzle than the investment. Moreover, the productive and complement government
purchases have positive impact on welfare for any policy rules. The optimized policy rules have
a pronounced anti-inflation stance and entail significant nominal and real exchange rate volatility
for monetary policy. For tax policy rules, the public debt stance is the optimized rules.
68
Page 68 of 166
Bibliography
[1] Backus, D. and Smith, G., 1993. Consumption and Real Exchange Rates in Dynamic
Economies with Non-Traded Goods. Journal of International Economics 35, 297-316.
[2] Backus, D., Kehoe, P. and Kydland, F. (1994). Dynamics of the Trade Balance and the Terms
of Trade: the J-Curve? American Economic Review 84, 84-103.
[3] Basu P. and Kollmann R., 2013. Productive Government Purchases and the Real Exchange
Rate. The Manchester School 81, 462-469.
[4] Baxter, M. and King, R. G., 1993. Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium. American Economic
Review 83, 315-334.
[5] Betts C. and Devereux M., 2000. Exchange Rate Dynamics in a Model of Pricing-to-Market.
Journal of International Economics 50, 215-244.
[6] Blanchard O. and Perotti R., 2002. An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of
Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117,
1329-1368.
[7] Borondo C., 2003. International Transmission of Monetary Shocks: Mundell-Fleming vs
Obstfeld-Rogoff. Macroeconomic Policy in an Open Economy : Applications of the Mundell-
Fleming Model, Nova Science Publisher, New York.
[8] Bouakez H. and Rebei N., 2007. Why Does Private Consumption Rise after a Government
Spending Shock? Canadian Journal of Economics 40, 954-979.
69
Page 69 of 166
[9] Devereux M. and Engel C., 2002. Exchange Rate Pass-through, Exchange Rate Volatility, and
Exchange Rate Disconnect. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 913-940.
[10] Devereux M. and Engel C., 1998. Fixed vs Floating Exchange Rates: How Price Setting
Affects the Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime. NBER Working Paper Series 6867.
[11] Devereux M. and Yetman J., 2013. Globalization, Pass-through and the Optimal Policy Re-
sponse to Exchange Rates.Working Paper.
[12] Chari V., Kehoe P. and McGrattan E., 2002. Monetary Shocks and Real Exchange Rates
in Sticky Price Models of International Business Cycles. Review of Economics Studies 69,
533-563.
[13] Christie T. and Rioja F., 2012. Debt and Taxes: Financing Productive Government Expendi-
tures. Working Paper.
[14] Corsetti G., Meier A., and Müller G.J., 2009. Fiscal Stimulus with Spending Reversals. IMF
Working Paper 106.
[15] Enders Z, Müller G.J., and Scholl A.,2011. How Do Fiscal and Technology Shocks Affect
Real Exchange Rates? Journal of International Economics 83, 53-69.
[16] Engel C., 2014a. Exchange Rate Stabilization and Welfare. Forthcoming Annual Review of
Economics, vol. 6.
[17] Engel C., 2014b. Exchange Rate and Interest Parity. Forthcoming in the Handbook of Inter-
national Economics, vol. 4 (Elsevier).
[18] Engel C. and Rogers J., 2001. Deviations from Purchasing Power Parity: Causes and Welfare
Costs. Journal of International Economics 55, 29-57.
[19] Ercolani V., 2007. The Relation Between Private Consumption and Government Spending:
Theory and Some Evidence from a DSGE Approach. Working Paper.
70
Page 70 of 166
[20] Escude G., 2013. A DSGE model for a SOE with Systematic Interest and Foreign Exchange
Policies in which Policymakers Exploit the Risk Premium for Stabilization Purposes. Central
Bank of Argentina Working Paper Series 61.
[21] Fama E., 1984. Forward and Spot Exchange Rates. Journal of Monetary Economics 14, 319-
338.
[22] Forni L. and Pisani M., 2010. Fiscal Policy in Open Economy: Estimates for the Euro Area.
Working Paper.
[23] GaliJ., Lopez-Salido, D. and Valles, J. (2007). Understanding the Effects of Government
Spending on Consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association 5, pp. 227-270.
[24] Kollmann R., 2010. Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate. Open Econ Rev 21,
49-64.
[25] Kollmann R., 2002. Monetary Policy Rules in the Open Economy: Effect on Welfare and
Business Cycles. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 989-1015.
[26] Kollmann R., 1996. Incomplete Asset Markets and the Cross-Country Consumption Correla-
tion Puzzle. Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 20, 945-961.
[27] Kollmann R., 1995. Consumption, Real Exchange Rates and the Structure of International
Asset Markets. Journal of International Money and Finance 14, 191-211.
[28] Linnemann L., 2005. The effect of government spending on private consumption: a puzzle?
Journal of Money Credit and Banking 38,1715–35.
[29] Linnemann L. and Schabert A.,2003. Fiscal policy in the new neoclassical synthesis. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 35, 911–29.
[30] Lombardi G. and Vestin D., 2007. Welfare Implications of Calvo vs. Rotemberg Pricing As-
sumptions. European Central Bank Working Paper Series 770.
71
Page 71 of 166
[31] McCallum B. and Nelson E., 2004. Targeting vs. Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy.
Working Paper.
[32] Mihov I., 2013. The Exchange Rate as an Instrument of Monetary Policy. Macroeconomic
Review, 74-82.
[33] Monacelli T. and Perotti R., 2007. Fiscal Policy, the Real Exchange Rate ,and Traded Goods.
The Economic Journal 120, 437-461.
[34] Monacelli T. and Perotti R., 2007. Fiscal Policy, the Trade Balance, and the Real Exchange
Rate: Implications for International Risk Sharing. Working Paper, International Monetary
Funds.
[35] Monteiro G. and Turnovsky S., 2008. The Composition of Productive Government Expen-
diture : Consequences for Economic Growth and Welfare. Indian Growth and Development
Review 1, 57-83.
[36] Mountford A. and Uhlig H., 2009. What are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks? Journal of
Applied Econometrics 24, 960-992.
[37] Ramey V., 2011. Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s all in the Timing. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1-50.
[38] Ramey V. and Shapiro M., 1998. Costly Capital Reallocation and the Effects of Government
Spending. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48, 145-194.
[39] Ravn M., Schmitt Grohé S., and Uribe M., 2007. Explaining the Effects of Government
Spending Shocks on Consumption and the Real Exchange Rate. NBER Working Paper Series
13328.
[40] Sanchez R. P., 2001. Characterizing the Optimal Composition of Government Expenditures.
Working Paper.
72
Page 72 of 166
[41] Senay O. and Sutherland A., 2010. Local Currency Pricing, Foreign Monetary Shocks and
Exchange Rate Policy. Working Paper Series 1005.
[42] Walsh C., 2010. Monetary Theory and Policy. MIT Press, Cambirdge, Massachusets.
73
Page 73 of 166
Appendices
74
Page 74 of 166
A. The complete Non-Linear Model
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B. Log Linear Model
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)
+ γ
(
Css
Css + γGCss
)(
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ĜCt + Îgt +
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C. Sticky Price Model’s Impulse Responses  
Figure 1: Impulse Response for 1% increase in World Output 
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Figure 2: Impulse Response for 1% increase in World Output 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response for 1% increase in World Inflation 
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Figure 4: Impulse Response for 1% increase in World Inflation 
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Figure 5: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Government Consumption 
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Figure 6: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Government Consumption 
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Figure 7: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Government Investment 
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Figure 8: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Government Investment 
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Figure 9: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Risk Premium  
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Figure 10: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Risk Premium 
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Figure 11: Impulse Response for 1% increase in World Interest Rate 
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Figure 12: Impulse Response for 1% increase in World Interest Rate 
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Figure 13: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Domestic Productivity 
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Figure 14: Impulse Response for 1% increase in Domestic Productivity 
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Table 2.1: Baseline model. Optimized policy rule
SP FP PCP FER
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard deviations (in %)
Y 1.73 0.22 0.22 3.03
C 1.53 0.38 0.38 1.81
Ip 11.82 7.93 7.64 25.02
L 2.52 0.30 0.26 4.28
π 0.64 0.39 0.20 0.94
πd 0.79 0.22 0.16 0.98
GC 0.91 0.37 0.37 1.85
IG 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.38
G 0.92 0.38 0.38 1.82
R 0.63 0.30 0.19 0.98
S 3.20 1.14 0.92 6.52
RER 2.09 0.72 0.73 4.26
NFA 3.55 0.74 0.54 8.23
µd 2.67 0.00 0.00 3.87
µx 2.51 0.00 0.00 2.81
µm 3.82 0.00 0.00 1.56
Means (in%)
Y -0.91 -0.13 -0.21 1.57
C 0.15 1.08 1.09 -2.76
Y d -0.01 -0.27 -0.24 0.63
Y m -0.10 3.77 3.68 -0.11
Y x -8.71 -0.30 -1.17 -12.48
L -0.74 -0.55 -0.62 -2.64
K -1.47 1.18 1.07 -0.83
PK -2.07 1.68 1.51 -1.54
RER 0.10 -3.87 -4.57 -1.65
NFA 0.30 0.55 0.54 0.46
µd 0.00 1.2 1.2 -1.36
µx -0.09 1.2 1.2 0.01
µm 0.12 1.2 1.2 0.23
Welfare (% equivalent variation in consumption)
ζ 0.76 2.40 2.46 0.04
ζ m 0.68 2.18 2.23 0.01
ζ v 0.08 0.22 0.23 0.03
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Chapter 3
Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Small
Open Economy with Liquidity Constraint
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Abstract
What are the effects of liquidity facilities (unconventional credit policy) on macroe-
conomic and financial variables when a small open economy faces a liquidity shock?
To answer this question, we introduction the external sector with foreign private paper
and bonds in a DSGE model with both nominal and real rigidities. The main result
of this paper is that both unconventional credit policy has large quantitative effects
on macroeconomic and financial variables. In fact, with the quantitative easing, out-
put, consumption and investment stops to decrease after two quarters and then become
positive. However, without the liquidity facilities, output, consumption and investment
would have dropped continuously up to 10%, 15% 10%, respectively. This result is
closely related to DEFK ’s finding in terms of sign. Besides, the domestic inflation,
the objective of the conventional monetary policy, falls and becomes negative after
four quarters. Then, it raises and becomes positive up to two percent (2%) after eight
quarters. Furthermore, a negative liquidity shock under the quantitative easing has
positive impact on employment. Nominal and real exchange rates depreciate due to
a negative impact of liquidity shock. Finally, the liquidity shock has positive impact
on the financial variable (domestic and foreign spreads). The domestic and foreign
spreads increase up to 100 and 120 basis points, respectively.
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JEL classification : E44; E52; E62; F41
Keywords : Small Open Economy; Financial Frictions; Liquidity constraints; Unconventional
Monetary Policy; Fiscal Policy.
3.1 Introduction
During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, most of central banks from advanced economies has im-
plemented policies which departure from policy that is based on the management of the nominal
interest rate well-known as Taylor rule. Those policies consist of loans and liquidity facilities, swap
lines with other central banks, extending the list of collateral, asset purchases, and direct lending to
financial firms. Many papers have focused on the impact of those policies on the macroeconomic
and financial variables such especially the output, investment, consumption, inflation and interest
rate. Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero,and Kiyotaki(2011), DEFK, study the quantitative effects of
liquidity facilities, that they called liquidity shock, on macroeconomic and financial variables such
as output, nominal interest rate, investment... in the context of a closed economy. These falicities
consist of non-standard open market operations in which the central bank (governement) exchanges
highly liquid government paper (bonds) for less liquid private paper (equity). This paper expands
DEFK (2011) to a small open economy which faces credit frictions not only from the domestic
financial market, but also the foreign ones. In this context, the households’ portfolio includes two
types of bonds and private equity: domestic and foreign. Besides, in addition to the interventions
in domestic credit market through the liquidity facilities, this paper introduces the international re-
serves as the form of interventions that the government implements on the objective of alleviating
liquidity constraint in the foreign exchange and financial market by changing its holdings of inter-
national reserves. This type of interventions is more implemented by many emerging economies
in form of foreign exchange liquidity injections (Ishi, Stone and Yehoue (2009)). The aim of this
paper is to evaluate the effects of the central banks and/or government interventions (liquidity fa-
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cilities and foreign reserves) on macroeconomic and financial variables.
DEFK’s paper incorporates a particular form of credit frictions proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore
(2008) to evaluate the quantitative effects of the liquidity policies on macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables. The credit frictions proposed by DEFK consist of "resaleability" and borrowing
constraints. In fact, the latter constraint is more standard financial friction which means that the
entrepreneur who faces the opportunity to invest can borrow only up to a fraction of the value of
its current investment. However, the resaleability constraint that is less standard means that the
entrepreneur who faces the opportunity to invest can sell only up to a certain fraction of his/her
"illiquid" private paper in each period. The illiquid paper consists of all privately issued papers
such as commercial papers, bank loans, mortgages... The results of their simulations suggest that
the liquidity facilities’ policy is strongly effective. In this sense, in the absence of this policy, the
output and interest rate would have dropped by an additional fifty percent (50%) when the econ-
omy faces both borrowing and reseleability constraints.
In this paper, I incorporate the private foreign paper and foreign bonds in the DEFK’s model.
As for the foreign bonds, I assume that only the foreign issued private paper can be claimed by the
domestic households and not the contrary. This assumption on foreign bonds is standard to small
open economy’s models. Therefore, the net equity of the households consist of the domestic and
foreign equities that face the same reseleability and borrowing constraints. As for DEFK, the main
credit friction in this model is the reseleability constraint which is considered as liquidity shock.
Like DEFK (2011), I claim that the liquidity shock represents the source of financial crisis of 2008.
In addition to the liquidity shock, the paper considers six more shocks which are standard for small
open economy. These shocks are other sources of perturbation of small open economy due to (i)
productivity, (ii) uncovered interest parity (UIP), (iii) international interest rate, (iv) international
output, (v) international inflation, and (vi) government spending. Moreover, I assume that the do-
mestic and foreign bonds do not face the reseleability constraint which plays a crucial role in my
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analysis 1. When the economy faces a negative impact of liquidity shock, the level of investment
decreases which lower the output.
Furthermore, the model includes both nominal and real rigidities that have strong policy’s im-
plications. The nominal rigidities consist of prices’ stickiness for intermediate firms. This friction
causes inflation. Therefore, the central bank must keep the price levels constant in order to elim-
inate the costs introduced by the inflation. However, the real rigidity is related to the types of
households: (i) workers and (ii) entrepreneurs. This friction allows the model to explain not only
the cause of crisis of 2008, but also the intervention of central banks to eliminate the crisis. In
addition to the above rigidities, the model considers the monopolistic competition for intermediate
firms that produce less than the perfectly competitive firms. Therefore, the central bank should
deviate from its main objective of zero inflation by targeting the output gap as well. Based on the
above frictions, the paper proposes two types of monetary policies that are available for the central
bank: (i) conventional and (ii) unconventional. The conventional policy follows the Taylor’s rule.
However, the unconventional monetary policies are related to the credit market. This policy aims
to eliminate the liquidity constraints that accounts for a drop in investment by swapping partly
illiquid private paper for liquid bonds. Therefore, the policy makes the aggregate portfolio hold-
ings of the private sector more liquid and the financial market more lubricated. Also, the policy
reduces the fall in consumption and investment. Nevertheless, the unconventional policy does not
affect the reseleability constraint of the private sector.
The main result of this paper suggests that both unconventional and conventional policies have
a large qualitative effect on macroeconomic and financial variables. In fact, with the quantita-
tive easing, the output, consumption and investment stops to decrease after two quarters and then
becomes positive. However, without the liquidity facilities, output, consumption and investment
would have dropped continuously up to 10%, 15% 10%, respectively. This main result is closely
1This assumption is the same as in DEFK
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related to DEFK ’s finding. Besides, the domestic inflation, the objective of the conventional mon-
etary policy, falls and becomes negative after four quarters. Then, it raises and becomes positive up
to two percent (2%) after eight quarters. Furthermore, a negative liquidity shock under the quanti-
tative easing has positive impact on employment. Both nominal and real exchange rates depreciate
due to a negative impact of liquidity shock. Finally, there is a positive impact on domestic and
foreign spreads which attains 120 basis points.
The unconventional monetary policy introduces new branch of the literature into macroeconomic
models with financial frictions using the New Keynesian DSGE framework. But, the majority of
them focuses on closed economy and has neglected the case of small open economy. The seminal
work of Bernanke et al. (1999) launched this literature. This paper has been inspired by other
works such the work of Christiano et al. (2003, 2009, 2011), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007),
Curdia and Woodford (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Martins
(2012), Kara and Sin (2013), and Garcia(2013). However, the introduction of the financial fric-
tions in the models is exogenous and does not have any microeconomic foundations. This paper
expands DEFK model to a small open economy by modeling the international illiquid equity and
the policy related to the interventions of the central bank in the foreign exchange market. Even
though the policy is proposed by Garcia (2013) and Martins (2012), they do not consider the rese-
leability constraint.
The rest paper will be organized as follow. I will present the model in details in section 2. The
results are presented in section 3 and I will conclude the paper in section 4.
3.2 Model
The model is build on DEFK augmented with foreign sectors and retailers. There are six types of
agents: households, distribution sector, intermediate good producers, foreign sector, the monetary
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authority, and the government.
3.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households of the measure one. Each
household consists of a continuum of members indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. In every period , household
members receive an identical independent distributed draw that determines whether they are en-
trepreneurs or workers. The probability of being an entrepreneur is j ∈ [0,χ) , which, by the law
of large numbers, is also the fraction of entrepreneurs in the household. Each entrepreneur χ has
an opportunity to invest but does not work. Each worker member j ∈ [χ,1] supplies differentiated
labor of type j but does not invest.
Let Ct be the aggregate consumption of goods that each member of the household purchases in
the market at period t
Ct =
[
(1−αc)
1
ηc (Cdt )
ηc−1
ηc +(αc)
1
ηc (Cmt )
ηc−1
ηc
] ηc
ηc−1 (3.1)
where Cdt , C
m
t , ηc, and αc are respectively the consumption of domestic goods, the consumption of
import goods, the elasticity of substitution between import and domestic goods, and the share of
import goods in consumption. The total expenditure on consumption is the sum of domestic and
import good purchases by each member of the household.
PtCt = Pdt C
d
t +P
m
t C
m
t (3.2)
where Pt , Pdt , and P
m
t denote respectively consumer price index(CPI), the domestic producer prices
and import prices. The maximization of the equation (1) subject to (2) yields
Cdt = (1−αc)
(
Pdt
Pt
)−ηc
Ct , (3.3)
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Cmt = αc
(
Pmt
Pt
)−ηc
Ct . (3.4)
Plugging (3) and (4) into (1) yields the CPI as
P1−νt = [(1−αc)(Pdt )1−ν +αc(Pmt )1−ν ]. (3.5)
Each household optimizes
Et
∞
∑
s=t
β
s−t C
1−σ
s
1−σ
− L
1+γ
s ( j)
1+ γ
(3.6)
where β , σ , and γ denote the discount factor, the relative risk aversion, and the inverse elasticity
of work efforts, respectively.
Now, let recall the main assumptions for the household members. First of all, the entrepreneurs
do not work. Therefore, the hours of work or labor supply (Lt) is zero (Lt( j) = 0). Secondly, on
each period, the members of household choose to consume non-durable goods; to save on domestic
bonds or equity,and foreign bonds or equity; and to invest in capital. Besides, the foreign house-
holds do not buy the equity issued by the domestic household and bonds issued by the domestic
government. Therefore, only the domestic households are allowed to buy both foreign bonds and
equity. Furthermore, after the members have found out whether they are workers or entrepreneurs,
the households cannot reallocate their assets. Thus, any additional funds must be obtained outside
the household. Moreover, at the end of the each period, the household return all their earnings
(assets and income) to the household’s asset pool.
As each household member has a choice to save or invest depending on his type, their behav-
iors are not only different, but also complementary. The entrepreneurs have the opportunity to
invest in new homogeneous capital, It , whose cost per unit is PIt and rental income per unit is R
k
t .
Besides, the new capital depreciates each period at the rate of δ and has market value of Qt . The
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entrepreneurs have also the opportunity to borrow in order to finance their investment by issuing
equity, NIt , that is claimed by other households, N
O
t , in form of future returns. Therefore, the return
on new capital is R
k
t +(1−δ )Qt
pIt
. However, the workers can save by buying government bonds (Bdt ),
foreign bonds (Bt), private domestic equity (NOt ), and private foreign equity (N
F
t ). The market
price of private equity is Qt . Therefore, the return on equity, domestic bonds, and foreign bonds
are, respectively, R
k
t +(1−δ )Qt
Qt
, Rt , and RFt .
The household’s net worth on equity is defined as following
Nt = NOt +Kt +StϕtN
F
t −NIt . (3.7)
In comparison with both DEFK and KS, this formulation of the equation (7) includes the nominal
exchange rate (St), the risk premium (ϕt), and the private foreign equity (NFt )issued in the rest of
the world.
ϕt = exp[(
Bt
Bss
+
NFt
NFss
)+ψt ], (3.8)
where ψt is the the uncovered interest parity shocks.
The households also owns firms which produce not only goods (intermediate and final), but also
capital. At the end of each period, they earn profits, Dt , from those firms. For simplicity, I as-
sume that the households pay non-distortive taxes, Tt , to the government. Thus, the inter-temporal
budget constraint for the household is
Ct + pIt It +Qt [Nt− It ]+
Bdt
Pt
+
StBt
Pt
= [Rkt +(1−δ )Qt ]Nt +
Rt−1Bdt−1
Pt
+
StRFt ϕt−1Bt−1
Pt
+
WtLt
Pt
+Dt−Tt ,(3.9)
where Dt = DBt +D
I
t , D
B
t is the profit of firms producing goods, D
I
t is the profit of firms producing
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capital, Wt is the wage, and Lt is the hours work.
Following KM, DEFK and KS, the model has two financial frictions :
• Borrowing constraint which implies that any entrepreneur can only issue new equity up to a
fraction θ of the investment, and
• resaleability constraint which implies that in any given perioda household member can sell
only a fraction of φt of her existing equity holdings (both domestic and foreign).
The latter constraint is interpreted as liquidity shocks which capture changes in market liquid-
ity (e.g, DEFK and KM, KS). However, both domestic and foreign bonds are not subject to any
resaleability constraint. Therefore, they are liquid. Following the borrowing and resaleability con-
straints, the net equity can be written as
Nt = (1−θ)It +(1+φt)(1−δ )Nt−1. (3.10)
The equation (9) is valid only if the constraints are both binding. If θ is equal to one, the en-
trepreneur is free to finance his entire investment by selling equity in financial market. The desired
θ must be strictly less than one which implies that the entrepreneur has to keep a fraction of 1−θ
of his investment as own equity whose cost must be financed partly by his own fund.
Similar to the consumption, the total investment goods, It , consists of domestically and import
produced investment goods as
It =
[
(1−αI)
1
ηI (Idt )
ηI−1
ηI +(αI)
1
ηI (Imt )
ηI−1
ηI
] ηI
ηI−1
(3.11)
where Idt , I
m
t , ηI , and αI denote respectively the domestically produced investment goods, the
import investment goods, the elasticity of substitution between import and domestic investment
goods, and the share of import investment in total investment goods. Let the price of the total
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investment goods be pIt , then the demand for domestic and import investment goods are
Idt = (1−αI)
(
Pdt
pIt
)−ηI
It , (3.12)
Imt = αI
(
Pmt
pIt
)−ηI
Ct . (3.13)
Entrepreneurs
Since the entrepreneurs seek to invest, the equity’s price, Qt , must be greater than the price of
newly produced capital, pIt . This condition guaranties the equilibrium. In fact, when Qt > p
I
t the
entrepreneurs prefer to sell all his holdings of government and foreign bonds. Besides, they will
prefer to issue equity that other households will claim than buy other households’ equity. There-
fore, combining the condition (9),
Lt = 0, (3.14)
Bt = 0, (3.15)
and
Ct = 0 (3.16)
with (8) help to obtain the aggregate investment in the economy :
It = χ
[Rkt +(1−δ )Qtφt ]Nt +
Rt−1Bdt
Pt
+
StϕtRFt Bt−1
Pt
+Dt−Tt
pIt −θQt
. (3.17)
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The numerator of (13) measures the amount of liquidity available to finance the investment. How-
ever, the denominator measures the liquidity needed for one unit of investment. θQt represents the
amount that the entrepreneur finances his new capital by issuing equity. Therefore, any drop in φt
reduces the amount of liquidity available to finance investment (DEFK, 2011).
Workers
The workers choose Ct , Lt , Bdt , Bt , and Nt in order to maximize his utility subject to (8) and
(13). The first order conditions with respect to hours work, domestic bonds, foreign bonds, and net
equity are
Lt =
[
WtC−σt
Pt
]− 1
γ
, (3.18)
C−σt = βEtC
−σ
t+1
[
χ
Rt
πt+1
(Qt+1−pIt )
pIt+1−θQt+1
+
Rt
πt+1
]
, (3.19)
C−σt = βEt
St+1
St
ϕtC−σt+1
[
χ
RFt
Qt
(Qt+1−pIt )
pIt+1−θQt+1
+
RFt
Qt
]
, (3.20)
C−σt = βEtC
−σ
t+1
[
χ
(Rkt+1 +(1−δ )Qt+1φt+1)
Qt
(Qt+1−pIt )
pIt+1−θQt+1
+
(Rkt+1 +(1−δ )Qt+1)
Qt
]
. (3.21)
If χ = 0, the equations (15) through (17) are reduced to the standard euler equations without
financial frictions. According to DEFK for closed economy, there are two parts on the payoff
from holding bonds or equity. The first part is the standard return related to paper holding: Rt
πt+1
for domestic bonds and R
k
t+1+(1−δ )Qt+1
Qt
for domestic equity. For an small open economy, there
are two more standard returns : Stϕt
RFt
πt+1
for foreign bonds and Stϕt
(Rkt+1+(1−δ )Qt+1)
Qt
for foreign
112
Page 112 of 166
equity. The second part of the payoff is the premium χ (Qt−p
I
t )
pI−θQt
related to this paper (bonds or
equity), when in the hand of the entrepreneurs, relaxes their investment constraint. Therefore, if
the entrepreneur chooses to buy one extra unit of domestic government or foreign bonds at time t
instead of consumption, he gains Rt
πt+1
or StϕtR
F
t
πt+1
, respectively, extra units of liquidity at time t +1.
Besides, χpIt−θQt
measures the increase in investment afforded by an extra dollar liquidity (DEFK).
However, the magnitude of (Qt− pIt ) measures the value to the household of relaxing the constraint.
If the magnitude is larger, the more valuable for the household to acquire capital by investing and
pay pIt per unit, rather than pay Qt on the market. Therefore, the more liquid a paper is, the less it
bears premium.
3.2.2 Distribution Sector
This sector consists of consumption good producers and investment good producers. Both goods
are an aggregation of domestic and import goods that are produced by perfect competitive final
good firms.
Final Consumption and Investment Good Producers
The equations (1), (3), (4), and (5) give the details about the technology of the consumption good’s
production, the demand for domestic consumption good, the demand for import consumption good,
and the aggregate price level (CPI).
Similarly, the investment good is produced following the technology described by the equation
(10). The demands for domestic and import investment are described by the equations (11) and
(12). However, the investment goods are produced by transforming the consumption goods into
investment goods. Therefore, the producers choose the amount of investment good to maximize
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their profits
DIt = [p
I
t − (1+F
(
It
Iss
)
]It , (3.22)
by taking the price of new investment, pIt , as given. Following DEFK, the price of investment
goods is different from the price of consumption goods due to the adjustment cost function of the
investment with F(1) = F ′(1) = 0 and F ′′(1)> 0.
Final Domestic Good Producer
The final good is produced by a single firm that operates in perfect competitive market accord-
ing to the following technology by taking the price Pt as given
Yt =
(ˆ 1
0
Y
η−1
η
it di
) η
η−1
, (3.23)
where η is the elasticity of substitution across domestic intermediate goods and Yit is the aggregate
intermediate goods.
Let the price of intermediate goods be Pit , then the maximization problem is
maxYit PtYt−
ˆ 1
0
PitYitdi
. Thus, the demand for i− th intermediate goods firm’s output is
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Yt , (3.24)
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where the aggregate price level is given as
Pt =
(ˆ 1
0
P1−ηit di
) 1
1−η
. (3.25)
3.2.3 Intermediate Good Producers
Each intermediate good i is produced through the following technology
Yit = AtKαit−1L
1−α
it , (3.26)
where Kt , Lt , At , and 0 < α < 1 denote, respectively, the capital stock, the hours work, the total
factor productivity shocks and the share of capital stock in production. At is exogenous to all in-
termediate good producers.
As the firms operate in monopoly competitive market, they face two-stage problem : (i) mini-
mization of the cost and (ii) maximization of the discounted real profit.
On the first stage, each firm minimizes the real cost of production by taking the real wage (Wt)
and the real rent of capital stock (Rkt ) as given
min
Lit ,Kit
WtLit +Rkt Kit
subject to (25). The first order conditions are given as following with respect, respectively, to Lit
and Kit
Wt = (1−α)At
(
Kit
Lit
)α
= (1−α)MCt
Yit
Lit
, (3.27)
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Rkt = αAt
(
Kit
Lit
)α−1
= αMCt
Yit
Kit
, (3.28)
where MCt is the real marginal cost given by
MCt =
(
1
1−α
)1−α( 1
α
)α W 1−αt (Rkt )α
At
. (3.29)
However, on the second stage, each firm maximizes its discounted real profits in in Calvo’s setting.
Therefore, in each period, a fraction of (1−λ ) of firms can change their prices. Other firms can
only report their previous prices. Let P?dt and P
d
t be the average of the domestic price and the
domestic price respectively then the firms solve the following problem
max
P?dt
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βλ )sρt+s
[
Yit+s
(
P?d
Pdt+s
−MCt+s
)]
subject to
Yit+s =
(
P?dt
Pdt+s
)−ηd
Yt+s
the first order condition is
P?dt =
η
η−1
Et ∑∞s=0(βλ )
sρt+sPdt+sMCt+sYit+s
Et ∑∞s=0(βλ )sρt+sYit+s
(3.30)
where
(Pdt )
1−ηd = λ (Pdt−1)
1−ηd +(1−λ )(P?dt )1−ηd . (3.31)
and
ρt+s =
(
Ct+s
Ct
)−σ
. (3.32)
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3.2.4 Foreign Sector
This sector consists of import and export firms that operate in a monopolistic competition market
and set their prices à la Calvo.
Importing Firms
There is a continuum of importing firms that purchase a homogeneous goods at world market
prices P?t which are set in producers’ currency and transformed them into a differentiated final im-
port good, Y mt . The latter is sold to the household in form of consumption and investment goods.
The technology used by i− th producer is
Y mt =
[ˆ 1
t
(Y mit )
ηm−1
ηm di
] ηm
ηm−1
, (3.33)
where Y mt = C
m
t + I
m
t . As for the final good producer, the following demands for import con-
sumption and investment goods are derived from the maximization problem solved by the i− th
producer
Cit =
(
Pmit
Pmt
)−ηm
Cmt , (3.34)
Iit =
(
Pmit
Pmt
)−ηm
Imt , (3.35)
where Pmit is the price of import intermediate goods.
Similar to the intermediate Good Producers, the import good producers set their prices à Calvo.
Therefore, only a fraction of (1− λ ) of producers can reset their prices. All other firms are not
allowed to reset their prices. The firms that reset their prices can choose the same price P?mt . Thus,
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the firm’s problem is to solve the following
max
P?dt
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βλ )sρt+s
[
Y mit+s
(
P?m
Pmt+s
−MCmt+s
)]
subject to
Y mit+s =
(
P?mt
Pmt+s
)−ηm
Y mt+s
.
where
MCmt =
P?t St
Pmt
(3.36)
is the marginal cost for import good producer.
The first order condition is
P?mt =
η
η−1
Et ∑∞s=0(βλ )
sρt+sPmt+sMC
m
t+sY
m
it+s
Et ∑∞s=0(βλ )sρt+sY
m
it+s
(3.37)
Finally, the aggregate import price is defined as
(Pmt )
1−ηm = λ (Pmt−1)
1−ηm +(1−λ )(P?mt )1−ηm. (3.38)
Exporting Firms
Similar to the import good producers, there is a continuum of export firms that purchase the homo-
geneous good at price Pdt from the final good producer and differentiate it by brand naming. Then,
the export producers sell their goods to foreign markets at aggregate price Pxt in terms of consump-
118
Page 118 of 166
tion and investment. Therefore, the i− th exporting good producer face the following demand for
its product Y xit
Y xit =
(
Pxit
Pxt
)−ηm
Y xt (3.39)
where Y xt = C
x
t + I
x
t , P
x
it is the price for a single producer. Besides, the real marginal cost for the
firm, MCxt , is given as
MCxt =
Pdt
StPxt
. (3.40)
Besides, as for importing good producers, the exporting good producers choose the price, P?xt , that
maximizes their discounted real profits à la Calvo. Then, only a fraction of (1−λ ) firms is allowed
to change the price. The problem consists of
max
P?xt
Et
∞
∑
s=0
(βλ )s[Y xit+s
(
P?x
Pxt+s
−MCxt+s
)
]
subject to
Y xit+s =
(
P?xt
Pxt+s
)−ηx
Y xt+s.
The first order condition yields
P?xt =
η
η−1
Et ∑∞s=0(βλ )
sρt+sPxt+sMC
x
t+sY
x
it+s
Et ∑∞s=0(βλ )sρt+sY
x
it+s
. (3.41)
The aggregate import price has the following law of motion
(Pxt )
1−ηx = λ (Pxt−1)
1−ηx +(1−λ )(P?xt )1−ηx . (3.42)
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Finally, the aggregate export demand maybe expressed in terms of foreign output or demand for
domestic goods (investment and consumption) as following
Y xt =
(
Pxt
P?t
)−ηx
Y ?t , (3.43)
where P?t and Y
?
t are world price and output, respectively.
3.2.5 Relative Prices and Real Exchange Rate
Now let define some relative prices that will be helpful to solve the model in real terms.
ψ
m
t =
Pmt
Pt
=
πmt
πt
ψ
m
t−1, (3.44)
ψ
d
t =
Pdt
Pt
=
πdt
πt
ψ
d
t−1, (3.45)
ψ
x
t =
Pxt
P?t
=
πxt
π?t
ψ
x
t−1, (3.46)
ψ
?
t =
P?t
Pt
=
π?t
πt
ψ
?
t−1, (3.47)
ψ
x?
t =
Pxt St
Pt
=
πxt et
πt
ψ
?
t−1, (3.48)
ψ
I,d
t =
Pdt
pIt
=
πdt
π It
ψ
I,d
t−1, (3.49)
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ψ
I,m
t =
Pmt
pIt
=
πmt
π It
ψ
I,m
t−1, (3.50)
where πmt =
Pmt
Pmt−1
, πdt =
Pdt
Pdt−1
, πxt =
Pxt
Pxt−1
, π?t =
P?t
P?t−1
, π It =
pIt
pIt−1
, and et = StSt−1 .
The real exchange rate is defined as
RERt =
StP?t
Pt
=
etπ?t
πt
= Stψ?t (3.51)
3.2.6 Government
Since the entrepreneurs face the resaleability of private equity, the government executes the quan-
titative easing to solve the problem of credit crisis in the economy. Any unexpected negative
deviation in the resaleability parameter φt from its steady state value represents the credit crisis.
Therefore, the government buys private domestic equities from households by selling bonds (Ngt ).
Besides, it buys the private foreign equities from households by using its foreign reserves (FAt) in
order to intervene in the foreign exchange market. Then, the total intervention of the government
is given by
NTt = N
g
t +StFAt . (3.52)
The government conducts three types of policy : (i) the conventional monetary policy through the
standard Taylor’s feedback rule, (ii) the unconventional credit policy, and (iii) the unconventional
fiscal policy.
The monetary policy is conducted by the central bank according to the Tarlor’s feedback rule
Rt = Rss(
πdt
πdss
)γπ (
Yt
Yss
)γY (
et
ess
)γe (3.53)
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where the subscript ss denotes the steady state value.
The unconventional credit policy consists of purchasing of private paper, NTt , as function of liq-
uidity facilities used by the most of central banks like the Federal Reserve
NTt
Kss
= γk
(
φt−φss
φss
)
(3.54)
where the policy’s parameter γk must be negative since the economy faces a unexpected drop in
the resaleability parameter φt from its steady state value. According to DEFK, the above rule sug-
gests that the government intervenes in the credit through the open market operations only when
the liquidity of private paper is abnormally low. Therefore, when the liquidity becomes normal,
the facilities are discontinued. Besides, the government intervention in the credit market does not
relax the resaleability constraint. It affects only macroeconomic outcomes by changing the ag-
gregate portfolio composition of the private sector, skewing it toward liquid assets.On impact, the
intervention is effective only through its impact on expectations and prices.
The government budget constraint is given as following
Gt +QtNTt +
Rt−1Bdt−1
Pt
= Tt +[Rkt +[1−δ )Qt ]NTt +
Bdt
Pt
, (3.55)
where Gt is the government purchases. The equation (54) shows that the government finances its
purchases, its intervention in the credit market by purchasing private equity, and its debt repayment
by lump sum tax, Tt , returns on equity holdings, and new debt issuance.
The following fiscal rule ensures the government intertemporal solvency in order to avoid the
Ponzi’s Scheme
Tt−Tss = γT
[(
Rt−1Bdt−1
Pt
− RssB
d
ss
Pss
)
−QtNTt
]
, (3.56)
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where γT > 0, Tss, and
RssBdss
Pss
denotes, respectively, the policy parameter, the steady state of taxes
and beginning of period government debt. However, the state state value of NTt is assumed to be
zero. The value of γT is low because, by assumption, the adjustment of taxes to debt is slow to
reflect the fact that the government has to finance its spending by issuing mostly bonds.
3.2.7 Equilibrium Conditions
The market clearing conditions for the composite labor and capital are
Lt =
ˆ 1
0
Litdi
, and
Kt =
ˆ 1
0
Kitdi
. The law of motion of capital stock is
Kt = (1−δ )Kt−1 + It , (3.57)
and the capital stock is owned by either household or government as
Kt = Nt +NTt (3.58)
and the resource constraint is given as
Yt =Cdt +C
x
t +Gt + I
d
t + I
x
t +F
(
It
Iss
)
It , (3.59)
the balance of payments is
StPxt (C
x
t + I
x
t )−StP?t (Cmt + Imt ) = StFAt−StFAt−1 +StBt−StRFt−1ϕt−1Bt−1. (3.60)
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Finally, let define two more variables the expected rate of return on equity as
Rqt = Et
[Rk +(1−δ )Qt+1]
Qt
, (3.61)
and the expected return to capital as
Rrkt = Et [R
k
t +(1−δ )]. (3.62)
3.2.8 Exogenous Variables
The model considers seven exogenous variables:
log(Gt) = ρGlog(Gt−1)+ εGt , (3.63)
log(φt) = ρφ log(φt−1)+ εφ t , (3.64)
log(RFt ) = ρRF log(R
F
t−1)+ εRF t , (3.65)
log(ψt) = ρψ log(ψt−1)+ εψt , (3.66)
log(Y ?t ) = ρY ?log(Y
?
t−1)+ εY ?t , (3.67)
log(π?t ) = ρπ?log(π
?
t−1)+ επ?t , (3.68)
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and
log(At) = ρAlog(At−1)+ εAt . (3.69)
3.2.9 Solution Method and Welfare Measure
I solve my model using Sims’ (2000) second-order accurate method. The welfare is evaluated
through a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function around the steady state which
yields
E(U(Ct ,Lt))∼=U(Ct ,Lt)+E(Ĉt)−LssE(L̂t) (3.70)
−Var(Ĉt) (3.71)
where Var(Ĉt) is the variance of (Ĉt).
By expressing the welfare as the permanent relative change in consumption (compared to the stady
state), ξ , which gives
E(U(Ct ,Lt)) : U((1+ξ )Ct ,Lt)∼=U(Ct ,Lt)+E(Ĉt)−LssE(L̂t) (3.72)
−Var(Ĉt). (3.73)
Hence, the welfare ξ can be decomposed into two components ξ m and ξ v as following:
U((1+ξ m)Ct ,Lt) =U(Ct ,Lt)+E(Ĉt)−LssE(L̂t) (3.74)
U((1+ξ v)Ct ,Lt) =U(Ct ,Lt)−Var(Ĉt), (3.75)
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where ξ m and ξ v represent the mean of consumption and hours worked, and variance of consump-
tion. By applying the equation (6) into the previous equations yields
ln(1+ξ ) = E(Ĉt)−LssE(L̂t)−Var(Ĉt) (3.76)
ln(1+ξ m) = E(Ĉt)−LssE(L̂t) (3.77)
ln(1+ξ v) =−Var(Ĉt) (3.78)
Therefore,
(1+ξ ) = (1+ξ m)(1+ξ v). (3.79)
3.2.10 Parameters (non policy)
Most of non-policy parameters is drawn from the estimations of Garcia-Cicco (2011) and Koll-
mann (2002). However, the parameters related to credit frictions are drawn from DEFK (2011).
The financial variables of model are calibrated to quarterly data for Chile and South Africa in av-
erage from 1982 to 2012.
In order to computer the steady state value of different variables, it is important to choose the
steady state values of exogenous variables. As for DEFK, I set the steaty value of liquidity shock,
φss, equal to the value of borrowing constraint, θ . This value is φss = θ = 0.185 which means that
the entrepreneur can sell up to 18%of the equity holding within a quarter and 1− (0.815)4 = 56%
within a year. This is consistent with the data in average from Chile and South Africa.
The indexation of prices ε is set to 6 which corresponds the price-marginal cost steady state markup
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Table 3.1: Parameters’ values
β = 0.99 Discount factor
σ = 1.39 Relative Risk Aversion
δ = 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital stock
α = 0.24 capital share
αc = 0.36 Import share on consumption
αI = 0.55 Import share on investment
θ = 0.185 Borrowing constraint
χ = 0.05 Probability of investment opportunity
γ = 0.05 Probability of investment opportunity
ε = 6 Indexation of prices
ηc = 11.952 Elasticity of substitution between import and domestic consumption goods
ηI = 2.056 Elasticity of substitution between import and domestic investment goods
η f = 3.809 Share of domestic export goods in foreign output
Gss = 0.1 Steady state value of Government spending
Lss = 1/3 Steady state value of hours worked
ψk = -0.063 Central Bank intervention coefficient
ψT = 0.1 Transfer rule coefficient
Bdss
Yss
= 0.40 Steady state liquidity/GDP
Css
Yss
= 0.60 Steady state consumption/GDP
Iss
Yss
= 0.22 Steady state investment/GDP
Gss
Yss
= 0.18 Steady state Government spending/GDP
Tss
Yss
= 0.19 Steady state lum sum tax/GDP
factor for intermediate goods ε(ε−1) = 1.2. The price elasticity of substitution between import and
domestic consumption goods and domestic and import investment goods, are set ηC = 11.9252
and ηI = 2.056, respectively. The share of domestic export to foreign economy is set η f = 3.809.
Moreover, the elasticity of output with respect to capital, α , is set to 0.24 which is consistent also
with Kollmann (2002). The depreciation rate of the capital stock, δ , is set to 0.025 which corre-
sponds to many previous studies (e.g., Bouakez and Rebei, 2007; Kollmann, 2002; Garcia-Cicco,
2011). Following Kollmann (2002), λ = 0.75, the average interval that producers of intermediate
goods change their prices à la Calvo. Table 1 shows the value of the remained parameters.
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3.3 Results
The model is solved using Dynare (version 4.4.3). The appendices A and B shows the response
of the main macroeconomic and financial variable to different shocks. The appendix A shows
the response of the variables under the unconventional policy (liquidity facility). However, the
appendix B reports the response of these variables in absence of the unconventional policy. All
the responses depend on the optimal conventional policy based on nominal interest rate (Rt) which
reacts to inflation gap and output gap. For the inflation, I use the producer price index(PPI). The
optimized policy rule depends on whether or not the unconventional policy is used. When the latter
is used concomitantly with the first one, the optimized policy rule has inflation stance
Rt = Rss +1.23π̂dt +3.58Ŷt . (3.80)
But when the liquidity facilities policy is not used, the optimized policy rule has output stance
Rt = Rss +2.7π̂dt +3.9Ŷt . (3.81)
From the appendices A and B, under the unconventional monetary, the negative liquidity shock
has a negative impact on output for the first two quarters and a positive one after three quarters
due to the rise on investment.In fact, a drop of 1 percent in the liquidity shock has immediate
positive impact on investment after one quarter because the objective of the liquidity facilities is
to alleviate the credit constraint that burdens the entrepreneurs who have the possibility to invest.
However, in absence of the liquidity facilities of the central bank, when liquidity shock hits the
small open economy, the output drops continuously up to nearly 90% at the end of 25th quarter
due to a continuous negative impact of liquidity shock in investment drop. Even though the liq-
uidity shock has negative impact in investment and output for the entire period of the simulations,
the fall stops after two quarters for the investment and ten quarters for the output. Besides, when
the central bank uses the liquidity facilities policy, a negative liquidity shock has positive impact
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on consumption for about thirteen quarters and negative after that due to an increase in nominal
interest rate. Nevertheless, in absence of liquidity facilities, a negative liquidity shock has negative
impact on consumption for the entire period of the simulations.
The negative liquidity shock also affects the real exchange rate. Under the unconventional mon-
etary policy, the liquidity shock depreciates the real exchange rate for the first thirteen quarters
and appreciates slightly after that. This depreciation of the real exchange rate boots the domestic
export in comparison to the import of foreign goods (investment and consumption). Thus, the
country accumulates more international reserves for its unconventional policy. In absence of the
unconventional policy, the liquidity shock appreciates the real exchange rate which lowers the de-
mands of the domestic good from the foreign consumers but increases the demand of the foreign
goods from the domestic consumers. Consequently, the aggregate consumption and investment
will not fall dramatically due to a decrease in both import and export.
Furthermore, the interventions of the central bank affects the inflation. The liquidity shock has
a negative impact of inflation (CPI) which declines up to 5% after two quarters and then rises up
to 0.5% at the end of the period of the simulation (25th quarter). The inflation, measured in terms
of PPI and the target of the central bank, drops to 5% after 8 quarters and then rises up to 2% at
the end of period of simulation. Since the central bank uses two different instruments for its mon-
etary policy, the objective of the management of nominal interest through the inflation and output
gap combined with facilities are effective. In absence of the central bank’s interventions, the PPI
inflation decreases continuously up to 2%. The CPI inflation, however, increases up to 2% and
decreases continuously.
The impact of the liquidity shock on financial variable is positive. A negative shock affects posi-
tively the prices, especially pIt , R
k
t , and Qt , when the central bank intervenes in the credit market
by its liquidity. The impact is negative on the return of capital, Rkt , if there are no central bank
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intervention in the credit market. As for DEFK, I define a financial variable called spread of equity
versus liquid paper. The spread is defined as the difference in expected returns between illiquid
and liquid paper. In the domestic credit market, the spread is defined as
Et
[
Rkt+1 +(1−δ )Qt
Qt
− Rt
πt+1
]
. (3.82)
However, for the foreign papers, the households receive a premium ϕt for buying a foreign paper
(bonds or equity)
EtStϕt
[
Rkt+1 +(1−δ )Qt
Qt
− R
F
t
πt+1
]
. (3.83)
The figures in appendices C.1 and C.2 show the impact of the liquidity shock on the spreads with
and without the central bank’s interventions. With the central bank’s interventions in the credit
market, the liquidity shock generates positive impact on both domestic and foreign spreads. In
terms of magnitude, the impact on foreign spread is more pronounced than on domestic one. In
fact, the liquidity shock causes the foreign spread to increase by 120 basis points against less
than 100 basis points for the domestic spread. This maybe due to not only on the premium that
households receive by buying foreign bonds and equity, ϕt , but also the combined external shocks
(foreign inflation, output and nominal interest rate). Nevertheless, the impact is negative on both
spreads if there are no interventions of the central bank.
This paper expand DEFK’s model to a small open economy. When comparing the effects of the
interventions on the key macroeconomic and financial variables, there is a difference on the mag-
nitude of the impact of the intervention on key macroeconomic variables. The result is consistent
with actual data for both Chile and South Africa. In fact, my simulations generate not only an
immediate positive increase after a negative impact, but also a persistent expansion of the output.
In period of 2010 to 2012, the growth rate of GDP for South Africa was 3.0%, 3.2%,and 2.2%
respectively again −1.5% in 2009. For the same period, Chile realized 5.7%, 5.8%,and 5.5% re-
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spectively again −0.7% in 2009. DEFK’s simulations for developed countries predict a negative
impact on output when the liquidity shock hits the economy, but the drop has stopped and the out-
put has initiated its expansion. The immediate impact for developing countries maybe due to the
combined effects of the government spending and the international reserve which are not taking
into account in DEFK’s analysis. Similarly, the difference is observed on the impact of variable
inflation targeted by the central bank. My model generates a positive increase on PPI inflation after
nine quarters. The DEFK’s model, however, predict only a immediate stop on inflation which is
still negative for the entire period under simulations. Besides, the same difference is observed for
consumption and investment. My model predicts a positive impact on investment when the liquid-
ity shock hits the small open economy, but the DEFK’s model predicts a negative one. Finally, for
the financial variable, the spreads, there is no difference between the two models.
3.4 Conclusion
What are the effects of liquidity facilities (unconventional credit policy) on macroeconomic and
financial variables when a small open economy faces a liquidity shock? To answer this question,
we introduction the external sector with foreign private paper and bonds in a DSGE model with
both nominal and real rigidities. The main result of this paper is that both unconventional credit
policy has large quantitative effects on macroeconomic and financial variables. In fact, with the
quantitative easing, output, consumption and investment stops to decrease after two quarters and
then become positive. However, without the liquidity facilities, output, consumption and invest-
ment would have dropped continuously up to 10%, 15% 10%, respectively. This result is closely
related to DEFK ’s finding in terms of sign. Besides, the domestic inflation, the objective of the
conventional monetary policy, falls and becomes negative after four quarters. Then, it raises and
becomes positive up to two percent (2%) after eight quarters. Furthermore, a negative liquidity
shock under the quantitative easing has positive impact on employment. Nominal and real ex-
change rates depreciate due to a negative impact of liquidity shock. Finally, the liquidity shock has
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positive impact on the financial variable (domestic and foreign spreads). The domestic and foreign
spreads increase up to 100 and 120 basis points, respectively.
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Appendices
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A. IRF with Quantitative easing 
 
A.1. Impact of 1% drop in liquidity shock 
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A.2. Impact of 1% drop in liquidity shock 
 
 
5 10 15 20 25
-5
0
5
10
15
x 10
-3 fa
5 10 15 20 25
-15
-10
-5
0
5
x 10
-3 pI
5 10 15 20 25
-2
-1
0
1
x 10
-3 q
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.005
0.01
rk
5 10 15 20 25
-6
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 s
5 10 15 20 25
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
x 10
-3 rer
5 10 15 20 25
0
1
2
3
4
x 10
-4 r
Page 138 of 166
 
A.3. Impact of 1% increase in UIP shock 
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A.4. Impact of 1% increase in UIP shock 
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A.5. Impact of 1% increase in Government Spending shock 
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A.6. Impact of 1% increase in Government Spending shock 
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A.7. Impact of 1% increase in Productivity shock 
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A.8. Impact of 1% increase in Productivity shock 
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A.9. Impact of 1% increase in Foreign Output shock 
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A.10. Impact of 1% increase in Foreign Output shock 
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A.11. Impact of 1% increase in Foreign Nominal Interest shock 
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A.12. Impact of 1% increase in Foreign Nominal Interest shock 
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A.13. Impact of 1% increase in Foreign Inflation shock 
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A.14. Impact of 1% increase in Foreign Inflation shock 
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B. IRF without Quantitative easing 
 
B.1. Impact of 1% drop in liquidity shock 
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B.2. Impact of 1% drop in liquidity shock 
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B.3. Impact of 1% increase in UIP shock 
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B.4. Impact of 1% increase in UIP shock 
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B.5. Impact of 1% increase in Government Spending shock 
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B.6. Impact of 1% increase in Government Spending shock 
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B.7. Impact of 1% increase in Productivity shock 
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B.8. Impact of 1% increase in Productivity shock 
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B.8. Impact of 1% increase in World Output shock 
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B.10. Impact of 1% increase in World Output shock 
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B.11. Impact of 1% increase in World Nominal Interest Rate shock 
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B.12. Impact of 1% increase in World Nominal Interest Rate shock 
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B.13. Impact of 1% increase in World Inflation shock 
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B.14. Impact of 1% increase in World Inflation shock 
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C.1 Impact on Domestic and Foreign Spreads with Quantitative Easing 
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C.2 Impact on Domestic and Foreign Spreads without Quantitative Easing 
 
5 10 15 20 25
-4
-2
0
2
4
x 10
-5 spread
5 10 15 20 25
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
x 10
-4 spreadf
Page 166 of 166
